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sustaining medical treatment, and to have that directive complied with
by medical professionals. That right is protected by both the common
law and, to an extent, by legislation that has been enacted in the United
Kingdom and many jurisdictions in Australia. The courts have a critical
role in protecting that autonomy, both in those jurisdictions in which the
common law continues to operate and in those jurisdictions which are
now governed by statute, and in which judicial determinations will need
to be made about legislative provisions. The problem explored in this
paper is that while the judiciary espouses the importance of autonomy
in its judgments, that rhetoric is frequently not reflected in the decisions
that are reached. In the United Kingdom and Australia, there is a relat-
ively small number of decisions that consider the validity and applic-
ability of advance directives that refuse life-sustaining medical
treatment. This paper critically evaluates all of the publicly available
decisions and concludes that there is cause for concern. In some cases,
there has been an unprincipled evolution of common law principles,
while in others there has been inappropriate adjudication through
operational irregularities or failure to apply correct legal principles.
Further, some decisions appear to be based on a strained interpretation
of the facts of the case. The apparent reluctance of some members of the
judiciary to give effect to advance directives that refuse treatment is also
evidenced by the language used in the judgments. While the focus of
this paper is on common law decisions, reference will also be made to
legislation and the extent to which it has addressed some of the prob-
lems identified in this paper.
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I. Introduction
At the end of life, competent adults are frequently required to make
difficult decisions about medical treatment that they wish to receive or
refuse. In some cases, because of an individual’s life values and goals,
he or she may wish to refuse treatment that many others, including
that person’s treating team, may wish him or her to undergo. While
good medical practice dictates that medical professionals and the
patient discuss treatment options and pathways, the decision to ac-
cept or refuse treatment offered ultimately rests with the patient. This
is so even if the choice is no treatment at all, and that choice results in
the patient’s death. While perhaps complicated by issues of proof, at
common law the position is the same if a competent adult has made a
treatment decision in advance of the medical situation arising, and
subsequently loses capacity. That person’s previously communicated
treatment decision will prevail, even if those close to the individual or
the treating medical professional would prefer a different treatment
pathway to be chosen.
From a legal perspective, two important principles are relevant
when considering a competent adult’s refusal of life-sustaining med-
ical treatment, whether that refusal is made contemporaneously or in
advance.1 The first principle is that of sanctity of life. In a liberal
democracy, the state’s interest in preserving the life of its citizens is
reflected in legal doctrine. For this reason, an adult’s request for life-
sustaining treatment to be withdrawn or withheld will be closely
scrutinized. The second principle is autonomy, from which stems a
right to determine one’s medical treatment. This is regarded as an
almost inviolable right in a liberal democracy, and is also a principle
that is recognized by the law.2 These two principles do not sit together
comfortably in the context of a competent adult’s contemporaneous
or advance decision to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment.
Nevertheless, the legal position is clear. While the principle of sanctity
of life is an important one that prevails in many circumstances, it is
trumped by the principle of autonomy when the two conflict.3 At
common law, a competent patient cannot be forced to receive un-
wanted treatment in order to sustain life, and a decision to refuse such
treatment that is made in advance must be complied with. To a large
extent, this also represents the statutory position in those jurisdictions
1 These principles and the relevant legal authority are considered in section II.
2 Note that the right to determine one’s own medical treatment is not absolute. For
example, individuals may be detained and treated against their will pursuant to
mental health legislation that exists in most jurisdictions.
3 See, for example, Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95 at 112; Airedale
NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 at 864; Re AK (Medical Treatment: Consent)
[2001] 1 FLR 129 at 134; HE v A Hospital NHS Trust [2003] 2 FLR 408 at 416; W
Healthcare NHS Trust v H [2005] 1 WLR 834 at 838.
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that have engaged in statutory reform. Legislation recognizes the
right of a competent adult to complete an advance directive that re-
fuses life-sustaining medical treatment.4
It is not only the common law and legislation that recognizes a
competent adult’s right to refuse treatment. There exists an enormous
body of literature from the disciplines of philosophy, medical ethics
and law which supports the notion of autonomy underpinning our
legal framework more broadly, and specifically in the context of refus-
ing treatment.5
The failure to recognize autonomy would have significant implica-
tions for us as a liberal democracy. In the context of decisions to
refuse treatment, the supremacy of bodily integrity itself would be at
risk. An equally dangerous situation would arise if the courts, while
overtly purporting to support the principle of autonomy, made deci-
sions which undermined the spirit of the principle by actively seeking
justification for not following a refusal of treatment contained in an
advance directive.
Yet, it is this latter hypothesis that has troubled commentators over
recent years. The approach taken by the judiciary in end-of-life cases
generally, and in decisions involving advance directives that refuse
life-sustaining medical treatment in particular, has been the subject of
rigorous scrutiny and criticism. Commentators have argued that un-
justifiable decisions have been reached because judges apply legal
principles from a particular bias. This bias can stem from a judge’s
particular perception of the meaning of autonomy, or from a personal
4 Statutory reform is considered in section III.
5 Relevant here is the work of J.S. Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays (Oxford
University Press: New York, 1991) and of R. Dworkin, Life’s Dominion: an
argument about abortion and euthanasia (Harper Collins: London, 1993). See also
J.F. Childress, ‘The Place of Autonomy in Bioethics’ (1990) 20(1) The Hastings
Center Report 12; S. Ikonomidis and P.A. Singer, ‘Autonomy, liberalism and
advance care planning’ (1999) 25 Journal of Medical Ethics 522; J. Coggon, ‘Varied
and principled understandings of autonomy in English law: Justifiable
inconsistency or blinkered moralism?’ (2007) 15 Health Care Anal 235;
S. Michalowski, ‘Advance refusals of life-sustaining medical treatment: the
relativity of an absolute right’ (2005) 68(6) Modern Law Review 958. Note also the
criticisms that have been levelled at autonomy as the appropriate principle to
underpin the regulation of advance directives: see, for example, R. Dresser,
‘Missing Persons: Legal Perceptions of Incompetent Patients’ (1994) 46 Rutgers
Law Review 609; R. Dresser, ‘Dworkin on Dementia: Elegant theory, questionable
policy’ (1995) 25 (6) The Hastings Center Report; R.A. Burt, ‘The end of autonomy’
(2005) 35 Hastings Center Report S9 at S9; G. Winzelberg, L. Hanson and J. Tulsky,
‘Beyond autonomy: diversifying end-of-life decision-making approaches to serve
patients and families’ (2005) 53 Journal of American Geriatrics Society 1046;
J.S. Taylor, ‘Autonomy and informed consent: a much misunderstood relationship’
(2004) 38 Journal of Value Inquiry 383; L. Emanuel and E. Emanuel, ‘Decisions at
the End of Life: Guided by Communities of Patients’ (1993) 23(5) The Hastings
Center Report 6; A. Maclean, ‘Advance directives, future selves and decision-
making’ (2006) 14 Medical Law Review 291. 
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bias in favour of life, or from a bias that some lives are worth preserv-
ing regardless of expressed wishes.6
The thesis of this paper is consistent with these criticisms, namely
that many judges find an advance refusal to be invalid or not applic-
able to a medical situation because of a moral or emotional reluctance
to reach a decision that will result in the death of a vulnerable indi-
vidual. This paper adds to the debate in the following ways. First, it
reviews and undertakes a critical evaluation of all of the publicly avail-
able common law cases on advance directives in England and Aus-
tralia.7 It deconstructs the various judgments to distil precisely the
techniques and tools that are utilized by the judges in arriving at their
decisions—for the most part, not to follow the advance directive. This
analysis isolates a range of legal and practical factors that contribute
to this outcome, and provides evidence, from the language used in the
judgments themselves, of the reluctance of the judiciary to recognize
such advance directives. As part of this analysis, the paper also exam-
ines a recent decision of a superior court in Australia, Hunter and
New England Area Health Service v A,8 which signifies a much greater
preparedness to respect individual autonomy. In upholding the indi-
vidual’s advance refusal, McDougall J takes an approach which is
distinctly at odds with that taken in previous English and Australian
decisions. Secondly, the paper considers the legislation that operates
in the United Kingdom and in Australia, and the extent to which an
individual may refuse life-sustaining medical treatment in advance.
The paper also considers the effect that statutory reform has had on
the common law, and the extent to which the legislation has ad-
dressed the problematic issues that will be identified as arising from
the common law.
Until Hunter’s case, which may herald a more enlightened judicial
approach, there has not been a case in which a court has upheld an
advance directive where, at the time of hearing, the adult had lost
capacity. The conclusion reached is that, despite mouthing the words
of autonomy and self-determination, when called upon to make deci-
sions about advance refusals, the courts have generally been reluctant
to hold that the directives should govern treatment. This reluctance is
undesirable, not only for the adult whose previously expressed direct-
ive has been ignored, but for all of those in our society who wish to
6 See, for example, Coggon, above n. 5, Michalowski, above n. 5 and A. Maclean,
‘Advance directives and the rocky waters of anticipatory decision-making’ (2008)
16 Medical Law Review 1. There is also some Australian literature that is critical of
the judicial approach in end-of-life cases. See, for example, T. Faunce, ‘Re
Herrington: Aboriginality and the Quality of Human Rights Jurisprudence in end-
of-life decisions by the Australian judiciary’ (2007) 15 Journal of Law and Medicine
201 and J. Hamblin, ‘Blood transfusions and the limits of autonomy’ (1999) 7
Australian Health Law Bulletin 49.
7 England and Australia were chosen because there have been a reasonable
number of decisions involving advance directives, as well as legislative reform in
the area. 
8 [2009] NSWSC 761.
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plan for medical treatment or non-treatment at the end of life. Such an
approach undermines personal autonomy, a principle that underpins
our liberal democracy and judicial doctrine.
II. The Common Law (as Enunciated by the Judiciary)
The common law in England, and more recently Australia, has been
clearly articulated. A competent adult can refuse medical treatment
even if that treatment is necessary to keep him or her alive.9 Further, a
competent adult can complete a directive about the treatment he or
she does not wish to receive in the future should that person later lose
capacity to decide treatment.10 A medical professional who does not
comply with a patient’s decision to refuse treatment may be liable to
both civil and criminal sanctions.11
It necessarily follows from the above statement of legal principle
that, in cases of advance refusals of life-sustaining medical treatment,
the principle of autonomy prevails over that of sanctity of life. This
9 In England, see Re B (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [2002] 2 All ER 449; HE
v A Hospital NHS Trust [2003] 2 FLR 408 at 414 where Munby J agrees with the
assessment of Professor A. Grubb in ‘Competent adult patient: right to refuse life-
sustaining treatment’ (2002) 10 Medical Law Review 201 at 203 that ‘English law
could not be clearer’ on this point. In Australia, see Brightwater Care Group (Inc)
v Rossiter [2009] WASC 229 at [26].
10 In England, see Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95 at 103; Airedale
NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 at 864; Re C [1994] 1 All ER 819 at 824; Re AK
(Medical Treatment: Consent) [2001] 1 FLR 129 at 134; HE v A Hospital NHS Trust
[2003] 2 FLR 408 at 415; W Healthcare NHS Trust v H [2005] 1 WLR 834 at 838. In
Australia, see Hunter and New England Area Health Service v A [2009] NSWSC
761 at [40(6)]. This was the first decision of a superior court in Australia about the
validity of an advance directive at common law. However, even before this
decision, this was generally accepted as representing the Australian law: see, for
example, Queensland Law Reform Commission, Assisted and Substituted
Decisions: Decision-making by and for people with a decision-making disability,
Report No 49 (1996) Volume 1, 357; second reading speech introducing
amendments to the Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA) to provide
for statutory advance health directives where it was assumed that common law
advance directives were binding, 6 December 2006; although not expressly
addressing the point, the Victorian Court of Appeal in Qumsieh v Guardianship
and Administration Board & Anor [1998] VSCA 45 seemed to accept that a
common law advance directive would be binding in that jurisdiction. See also
I. Kerridge, M. Lowe and C. Stewart, Ethics and Law for the Health Professions,
3rd edn (The Federation Press: Sydney, 2009), 253; C. Stewart, ‘Advance
Directives: Disputes and Dilemmas’ in I. Freckelton and K. Petersen (eds), Disputes
and Dilemmas in Health Law (The Federation Press: Sydney, 2006) 38; J.
McIlwraith and B.I. Madden, Health Care and the Law, 4th edn (Thomson
Lawbook: Sydney, 2006) 132; J. Devereux, Australian Medical Law, 3rd edn
(Cavendish: London, 2007) 905; L. Skene, Law and Medical Practice, 3rd edn (Lexis
Nexis Butterworths: Sydney, 2008) [5.8].
11 See, for example, Re F [1990] 2 AC 1 at 73; Re T [1992] 4 All ER 649 at 653. For a
consideration of the causes of action that could potentially arise for failure to
comply with an advance directive, see S. Michalowski, ‘Trial and Error at the End
of Life—No Harm Done?’ (2007) 27(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 257;
H.F. Lynch, M. Mathes and N.N. Sawicki, ‘Compliance with advance directives:
wrongful living and tort law incentives’ (2008) 29 Journal of Legal Medicine 133. 
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position is reflected in and confirmed by the language used in end-of-
life decisions. The supremacy afforded to the principle of autonomy in
this context is perhaps most clearly articulated by Lord Goff in the
landmark decision of Airedale NHS Trust v Bland:
First, it is established that the principle of self-determination requires
that respect must be given to the wishes of the patient, so that if an adult
patient of sound mind refuses, however unreasonably, to consent to
treatment or care by which his life would or might be prolonged, the
doctors responsible for his care must give effect to his wishes, even
though they do not consider it to be in his best interests to do so . . .To
this extent, the principle of the sanctity of human life must yield to the
principle of self-determination . . . and, for present purposes perhaps
more important, the doctor’s duty to act in the best interests of his
patient must likewise be qualified. . . . Moreover the same principle ap-
plies where the patient’s refusal to give his consent has been expressed
at an earlier date, before he became unconscious or otherwise incapable
of communicating it . . .12
As part of the law’s attempt to balance the principles of sanctity of life
and autonomy, effect will only be given to an advance directive that is
valid and applicable to the circumstances that have arisen. If the dir-
ective is not valid, or valid but not applicable to the situation that later
arises, the appropriate treatment must be determined in another way.
Where there is doubt about validity or applicability, the advance re-
fusal will not be effective. In other words, any doubt is resolved in
favour of the preservation of life.13
For the advance directive to be valid, the adult must have had
capacity at the time the advance directive was made, and must have
been able to communicate the decision about treatment.14 At common
law, the meaning of ‘capacity’ is relatively settled and depends on the
12 [1993] AC 789 at 864. Note that this statement was made in dicta only, as the
patient in that case was a young man who was unconscious and had not
previously expressed his wishes about future treatment. These comments of Lord
Goff were referred to (and implicitly endorsed) in Re AK (Medical Treatment:
Consent) [2001] 1 FLR 129 at 133–4; Re B (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment)
[2002] 2 All ER 449 at 456; HE v A Hospital NHS Trust [2003] EWHC 1017 (Fam),
416.
13 See, for example, Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95 at 112; HE v A
Hospital NHS Trust [2003] 2 FLR 408 at 421. For commentary on the
appropriateness of using ‘bias in favour of life’ in determining the validity or
applicability of an advance directive, see Michalowski, above n. 5.
14 R (Burke) v General Medical Council [2005] QB 424 at 440 (although note that, in
overturning the decision, the Court of Appeal suggested caution in relying on
aspects of Munby J’s judgment in future cases: R (Burke) v General Medical
Council [2006] QB 273). Kennedy and Grubb suggest that there is a further
requirement for validity that the adult have sufficient information on which to
found a decision to refuse treatment: I. Kennedy and A. Grubb, Medical Law, 3rd
edn (Butterworths: London, 2000) 2037–8. This view has also received some
judicial support. Compare views expressed in L. Willmott, B. White and M.
Howard, ‘Refusing Advance Refusals: Advance Directives and Life-Sustaining
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ability of an adult to function rationally.15 Any undue influence or
other vitiating factor that was exerted on the adult at the time of
signing may also affect the validity of the advance directive.16 There
are no formality requirements for the advance directive to be valid,17
and it can be revoked by the adult at any time.18
Even if an advance directive is valid, before it will govern treatment
it must also be applicable to the adult’s circumstances. To be applic-
able, the issue is whether the adult intended the directive to govern
the medical situation that later arose. This will require a consideration
of the medical condition that later confronts the adult and the direct-
ive given previously, but also of whether the adult subsequently
evinced an intention no longer to be bound by the directive.19
III. Statutory Reform
The law governing advance directives has undergone significant stat-
utory reform in both the United Kingdom and Australia. While legis-
lative reform is relatively recent in the United Kingdom, statutory
reform commenced in Australia in the early 1980s and legislation has
now been enacted in six of Australia’s eight jurisdictions.
The Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK) was a long time in the making.
The Law Commission examined the broader body of regulation con-
cerning decision-making by and on behalf of individuals who lacked
the capacity to make their own decisions. The Commission published
a discussion paper20 and four consultation papers on a range of is-
sues,21 followed by a final report in 1995 entitled ‘Mental Incapacity’.22
Medical Treatment’ (2006) 30 Melbourne University Law Review 211 at 220–1. The
proposition that the validity of an advance directive will depend on whether the
directive is based on sufficient information is explored further in section V.i
below.
15 See, for example, Re C (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1994] 1 All ER 819;
Re MB (Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 426; Re B (Adult: Refusal of Medical
Treatment) [2002] 2 All ER 449; R (Burke) v General Medical Council [2005] QB 424.
16 For a consideration of when influence will be regarded as ‘undue’ and therefore
vitiate validity, see comments of Staughton LJ in Re T [1992] 4 All ER 649 at 669.
17 HE v A Hospital NHS Trust [2003] 2 FLR 408 at 417.
18 Ibid. at 418.
19 For a detailed consideration of circumstances in which a valid advance directive is
likely to be held not applicable at common law, see Willmott, White and Howard,
above n. 14.
20 Law Commission, Decision-Making and Incapacity: A Discussion Document (1989).
21 Law Commission, Mentally Incapacitated Adults and Decision-Making: An
Overview, Consultation Paper No 119 (1991); Law Commission, Mentally
Incapacitated Adults and Decision-Making: A New Jurisdiction, Consultation Paper
No 128 (1993); Law Commission, Mentally Incapacitated Adults and Decision-
Making: Medical Treatment and Research, Consultation Paper No 129 (1993); Law
Commission, Mentally Incapacitated and Other Vulnerable Adults: Public Law
Protection, Consultation Paper No 130 (1993).
22 Law Commission, Mental Incapacity, Report No 231 (1995).
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Although the United Kingdom legislation that was ultimately enacted
was largely based on the recommendations of the Law Commission,
there was extensive review of, and consultation on, those recom-
mendations carried out by the government. As part of this review, the
Lord Chancellor’s Department produced a Green Paper in 1997 en-
titled ‘Who Decides? Making Decisions on Behalf of Mentally In-
capacitated Adults’23 and a White Paper in 1999 entitled ‘Making
Decisions: The Government’s Proposals for Making Decisions on
Behalf of Mentally Incapacitated Adults’.24
Recommendations regarding advance directives about medical
treatment had an interesting evolution. The final report of the Law
Commission recommended that advance decisions refusing medical
treatment should be enforceable and that this right should be statut-
orily enshrined.25 Despite this recommendation, and despite seeking
the views of the public about the enactment of legislation in its Green
Paper, the government expressed the view in its White Paper that
advance directives should continue to be governed by the common
law only.26 Notwithstanding the government’s position as expressed
in the White Paper, the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK) ultimately
made provision for advance directives in sections 24–6.
Legislation has evolved in the various Australian jurisdictions on an
ad hoc basis, sometimes, but not always, following either a law reform
commission or governmental review. Reform commenced in South
Australia with the enactment of legislation in 1983.27 This statute was
subsequently repealed and replaced by the Consent to Medical Treat-
ment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA).28 The Northern Territory then
enacted the Natural Death Act 1988, which was largely modelled on
the earlier South Australian legislation. Victoria was next to pass
legislation, the Medical Treatment Act 1988, following a review of the
law by the Social Development Committee which was established by
the Victorian government to inquire into a number of issues related to
23 Lord Chancellor’s Department, Who Decides? Making Decisions on Behalf of
Mentally Incapacitated Adults, Cm 3803 (1997).
24 Lord Chancellor’s Department, Making Decisions: The Government’s Proposals for
Making Decisions on Behalf of Mentally Incapacitated Adults, Cm 4465 (1999).
25 Law Commission, Mental Incapacity, Report No 231 (1995), recommendations
11.25–33.
26 Lord Chancellor’s Department, Making Decisions: The Government’s Proposals for
Making Decisions on Behalf of Mentally Incapacitated Adults, Cm 4465 (1999) 3–4.
27 Natural Death Act 1983 (SA).
28 More recently, the South Australian Government established an Advance
Directives Review Committee, and the Attorney-General has recently released the
reports of the Committee: First Report of the Review of South Australia’s
Advance Directives—Proposed Changes to Law and Policy and Second Report of
the Review of South Australia’s Advance Directives—Stage 2 Proposals for
Implementation and Communication Strategies: http://www.agd.sa.gov.au/news/
index.php#advancedirectives (last accessed 14 October 2009).
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treatment of dying patients.29 The Australian Capital Territory govern-
ment enacted legislation in 199430 which was replaced by the Medical
Treatment (Health Directions) Act 2006 (ACT). Queensland enacted
the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 following a comprehensive review of
the law on substitute decision-making by the Queensland Law Reform
Commission.31 Western Australia was the most recent jurisdiction to
enact legislation governing advance directives. The Acts Amendment
(Consent to Medical Treatment) Act 2006 was enacted to amend the
Western Australian guardianship legislation by inserting a part on
advance directives.32 Similar to the reform process in the United King-
dom, the legislation followed a review by the Western Australian Law
Reform Commission33 and subsequent reviews34 and consultation by
the Western Australian Government.
These seven statutes (one in the United Kingdom and six in Aus-
tralia) differ significantly in many respects, including whether direc-
tions can be made about receiving and refusing treatment, or about
refusing treatment only, or about refusing life-sustaining treatment
only. However, they all share one important feature: a competent
person is entitled, at least in some circumstances, to make an advance
directive that refuses life-sustaining medical treatment. Further, it is
generally the case that an advance directive that complies with the
statutory requirements must be followed by medical professionals
who are treating the now incompetent person. All of the statutes
therefore, at least at some level, recognize and promote the principle
of autonomy.35
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to comprehensively
review the legislation, some of the major features of the statutory
regimes should be mentioned. There are many similarities in how the
statutes regulate advance directives refusing life-sustaining medical
treatment, including the following:
29 The final report of the Committee, ‘Inquiring into Options for Dying with Dignity’
was delivered in April 1987.
30 Medical Treatment Act 1994 (ACT).
31 Queensland, Assisted and Substituted Decisions, Report No 49 (1996).
32 Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 Part 9B. Note that, at the time of
writing, Part 9B had not yet commenced operation.
33 Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, Medical Treatment for the Dying,
Project No 84, Report (1991) and Law Reform Commission of Western Australia,
Medical Treatment for the Dying, Project No 84, Discussion Paper (1988).
34 Medical Treatment for the Dying, Discussion Paper issued by the Attorney-
General and Minister for Health (2005).
35 Note, however, that some commentators have queried the extent to which
legislation has been effective to promote an individual’s autonomy in the context
of refusing treatment. In England, see Maclean, above n. 6; Michalowski, above
n. 5; C. Johnston, ‘Does the statutory regulation of advance decision-making
provide adequate respect for patient autonomy?’ (2005) 26 Liverpool Law Review
189; S. Halliday, ‘Advance decisions and the Mental Capacity Act’ (2009) 18(11)
British Journal of Nursing 697. In Australia, see Willmott, White and Howard,
above n. 14, and L. Willmott, ‘Advance Directives to Withhold Life-Sustaining
Medical Treatment: Eroding autonomy through statutory reform’ (2007) 10
Flinders Journal of Law Reform 287.
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• Most statutes contain a requirement that the advance directive
be in writing.36 Many statutes require the directive to be in a
prescribed form,37 and all of the statutes that require it to be in
writing also have witnessing requirements.38
• All of the statutes provide, either expressly or by necessary im-
plication, that an advance directive can only operate once the
person has lost competence to make decisions.39
• All of the statutes provide, again either expressly or by neces-
sary implication, that an advance directive will not operate if the
person has changed his or her mind about the directive, or that
circumstances have changed so that the person would no longer
have intended the directive to govern treatment.40
There are also some significant differences in the legislation, the
major ones being:
• Some statutes provide that a directive refusing life-sustaining
treatment can only operate if the person is sufficiently sick, or if
the disease has reached a certain stage.41
36 Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK), s. 25(6)(a); Consent to Medical Treatment and
Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA), s. 7(2); Guardianship and Administration Act 1990
(WA), s. 110Q(1); Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic), s. 5(2); Natural Death Act 1989
(NT), s. 4(1); Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld), s. 44(2). Compare the Australian
Capital Territory where the directive may be oral or in writing: Medical Treatment
(Health Directions) Act 2006 (ACT), s. 7(2).
37 Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK), s. 25(6)(a); Consent to Medical Treatment and
Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA), s 7(2); Guardianship and Administration Act 1990
(WA), s 110Q(1); Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic), s 5(2); Natural Death Act 1989
(NT), s 4(1). In the Australian Capital Territory, if the directive is in writing, it must
be in the prescribed form: Medical Treatment (Health Directions) Act 2006 (ACT),
ss 7(2) and 8. Compare Queensland where compliance with the prescribed form is
optional: Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld), s. 44(2).
38 Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK), s. 25(6)(c) and (d); Consent to Medical Treatment
and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA), s. 7(2); Guardianship and Administration Act
1990 (WA), s. 110Q(1); Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic), s. 5(1); Medical
Treatment (Health Directions) Act 2006 (ACT), s. 9; Natural Death Act 1989 (NT),
s. 4(2); Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld), s. 44(3).
39 Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK), ss 24(1)(b) and 25(3); Consent to Medical
Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA), s. 7(1)(b); Guardianship and
Administration Act 1990 (WA), s. 110S(1)(a); Guardianship and Administration
Act 2000 (Qld), s. 66.
40 Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK), s. 25(2); Consent to Medical Treatment and
Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA), s. 7(3)(b); Guardianship and Administration Act
1990 (WA), s. 110S(3) and (6); Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic), s. 7(1) and (3);
Medical Treatment (Health Directions) Act 2006 (ACT), ss 10(1) and 12; Natural
Death Act 1989 (NT), s. 4(3); Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld), s. 103.
41 In South Australia, a person must be in the terminal phase of a terminal illness
before the advance directive will operate: Consent to Medical Treatment and
Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA), s. 7(1)(a). In the Northern Territory, a person must
be suffering from a terminal illness: Natural Death Act 1989 (NT), s. 4(1). In
Queensland, the person must fall within one of the following categories before the
advance directive refusing treatment can operate: the person has a terminal
illness or condition that is incurable or irreversible and as a result of which, in the
opinion of a doctor treating the person and another doctor, the person may
reasonably be expected to die within one year; or the person is in a persistent
vegetative state; or the person is permanently unconscious; or the person has an
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• One statute allows only a person who is suffering from a par-
ticular condition to make a directive refusing treatment.42 The
same jurisdiction also makes the provision of information about
the person’s condition a prerequisite to the validity of the
directive.43
Another important area of differentiation is the role played by
the common law, following statutory enactment. The legislation in
Western Australia and Queensland expressly preserves the common
law.44 In those jurisdictions, it should therefore be the case that the
common law on advance directives would continue to operate along-
side the statutory regime.45 In Victoria, the Australian Capital Territ-
ory and the Northern Territory, while not expressly preserving the
common law, the statute provides that other rights to refuse treatment
are not affected by the legislation.46 In these jurisdictions too, the
common law would generally continue to operate alongside the stat-
utory regimes. In the United Kingdom and South Australia, the legis-
lation is silent on the continued operation of the common law. The
legislation in South Australia is narrow in focus, dealing only with
refusal of medical treatment when someone is in the terminal phase of
a terminal illness or in a persistent vegetative state. As such, it does
not purport to cover the range of situations in which a person could
give an advance directive at common law. It is therefore likely that the
common law would continue to operate.47
The position in the United Kingdom is different. Sections 24–6 of
the Mental Capacity Act 2005, unlike the provisions of the South
Australian statute, are comprehensive in coverage as they purport to
regulate all kinds of advance refusals of treatment. While the legisla-
tion does not expressly overtake the common law, it is clear that an
advance refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment can only operate
illness or injury of such severity that there is no reasonable prospect that the
person will recover to the extent that the person’s life can be sustained without
the continued application of life-sustaining measures: Powers of Attorney Act
1998 (Qld), s. 36(2)(a).
42 Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic), s. 5(1)(a).
43 Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic), s. 5(1)(c).
44 Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA), s. 110ZB and Powers of
Attorney Act 1998 (Qld), s. 39 respectively.
45 Note, however, that the provision may not have been effective in Queensland to
preserve the common law. Despite s. 39 of the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld)
which purports to preserve the common law, it is likely that, due to a drafting
error when enacting Queensland’s guardianship regime (comprised of Powers of
Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) and the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000
(Qld)), the common law regime no longer applies in Queensland: see B. White and
L. Willmott, ‘Will you do as I ask? Compliance with instructions about health care
in Queensland’ (2004) 4 Queensland University of Technology Law and Justice
Journal 77.
46 Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic), s. 4; Medical Treatment (Health Directions) Act
2006 (ACT), s. 6(1); Natural Death Act 1989 (NT), s. 5(1).
47 This view is shared by legal commentators. See, for example, C. Stewart, ‘The
Australian experience of advance directives and possible future directions’ (2005)
24 Australasian Journal on Ageing S25.
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if it complies with the formality requirements. This leaves no further
room for the operation of informal advance directives. This position is
also evident from the transitional provisions. In relation to decisions
that refuse life-sustaining treatment, the transitional provisions in-
dicate that common law advance directives entered into before the
commencement of the legislation on 1 October 2007 will only operate
if they satisfy the provisions of the transitional instrument.48 It follows
that common law directives that do not comply will not be binding.
The implication is that the statutory scheme has effectively overtaken
the common law in relation to advance directives that refuse life-
sustaining medical treatment.
Despite the legislative reform described above, it is submitted that
the common law will continue to play a significant role in relation to
advance refusals of life-sustaining treatment in all jurisdictions. In
those jurisdictions that have both statutory and common law regimes,
an individual may still make a binding common law directive and
there is no obligation for that directive to comply with legislative
requirements. Further, an unsuccessful attempt to complete a stat-
utory advance directive may still be effective as a common law
directive.
It is likely that the common law and approaches taken by the judici-
ary in developing common law principles will also continue to play a
role in jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom, where the common
law has become embedded in statute. First, the common law has
developed a body of jurisprudence which is likely to be influential
when interpreting the statute.49 Further, the interpretation of some
words and phrases that are used in the legislation may be informed
by relevant case law and commentary on the common law position.
Secondly, the approaches taken by judges in the common law cases
will be relevant. Should doubt arise about the existence, validity or
applicability of a statutory advance directive, the matter will be deter-
mined by the newly established Court of Protection.50 Members of the
court, which is headed by a former President of the Family Division of
the High Court, may well be influenced by, or indeed agree with, the
attitudes of and approaches taken previously by the High Court (and
the Court of Appeal) when considering the validity and applicability
of advance directives at common law. As with most pieces of complex
legislation, there will undoubtedly be many provisions in the Mental
Capacity Act 2005 that will require judicial interpretation. Some areas
of ambiguity in relation to advance refusals of medical treatment have
48 Statutory Instrument 2007/1898, para 5.
49 P. Bartlett, Blackstone’s Guide to the Mental Capacity Act, 2nd edn (Oxford
University Press: Oxford, 2008) 26 at 41.
50 Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK), s. 26(4).
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already been identified.51 Judicial attitudes to date suggest an unwill-
ingness or reluctance to uphold common law directives that refuse
treatment. Under the statutory regime, the willingness or otherwise of
a judge to allow the autonomous choice of an individual to prevail will
continue to be critical.
Statutory provisions from the United Kingdom and Australian
statutes will be considered below where they assist in informing a
consideration of the common law.
IV. The Common Law (as Applied by the Judiciary)—An
Overview
There have been only a handful of cases in which courts have been
called upon to decide whether advance directives that refuse life-
sustaining treatment should be followed by medical professionals. In
England and Australia, there have been eight such decisions over the
past two decades, with six being decided since 2000:
• Re C (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment)52—advance directive
followed (High Court, England)
• Re AK (Medical Treatment: Consent)53—advance directive fol-
lowed (High Court, England)
• HE v A Hospital NHS Trust54—advance directive not followed
(High Court, England)
• W Healthcare NHS Trust v H55—advance directive not followed
(Court of Appeal, England)
• NHS Trust v T (Adult Patient: Refusal of Medical Treatment)56—
advance directive not followed (High Court, England)
• Qumsieh’s case57—advance directive not followed (Guardianship
and Administration Board, Victoria, Australia)58
• State of Qld v Astill59—advance directive not followed (Supreme
Court of Queensland, Australia)
51 See, for example, Maclean, above n. 6 who gives an example the scope for
interpretation. Maclean refers to section 24, which allows a person to refuse
‘specified treatment’. A narrow reading of that provision may mean that the term
does not extend to the refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment generally. This
ambiguity gives a court the ability to hold that a general advance refusal falls
outside of the statutory scheme.
52 [1994] 1 All ER 819.
53 [2001] 1 FLR 129.
54 [2003] 2 FLR 408.
55 [2005] 1 WLR 834.
56 [2005] 1 All ER 387.
57 Unreported decision, Guardianship and Administration Board, L Pilgrim, 24
February 1998.
58 This matter went on appeal, although the decision of the Board was not reviewed:
see further Appendix.
59 Unreported decision, Supreme Court of Queensland, Muir J, 18 January 2006.
13
ADVANCE DIRECTIVES REFUSING TREATMENT AS AN EXPRESSION OF AUTONOMY
• Hunter and New England Area Health Service v A60—advance
directive followed (Supreme Court of New South Wales,
Australia)
It is interesting to speculate as to why so few cases have resulted in
litigation, particularly given the likelihood that common law advance
directives would not be an uncommon feature of medical practice. It is
perhaps the case that, generally speaking, advance directives are
complied with by medical professionals so there is no dispute that
requires adjudication. It is also possible that many individuals who are
concerned about non-compliance with an advance directive are un-
willing for the dispute to be resolved through an adversarial judicial
process. The narrow timeframe in which many such decisions must be
made may also be a factor in the small number of cases that have been
litigated.
An interesting feature of the decided cases is that they all involve an
advance directive being given with a particular medical context in
mind. In four of the cases, the individuals were either Jehovah’s Wit-
nesses or had adopted some of the beliefs of that faith. The advance
directives in these cases had been given for the specific reason of
refusing blood products or other surgical intervention. Two other
cases involved a 19-year-old man and a 59-year-old woman who were
suffering from motor neurone disease and multiple sclerosis respect-
ively. Their advance directives were given with their diseases in mind.
In the remaining two cases, the individuals were a 68-year-old man
and a 37-year-old woman who suffered from mental illnesses, para-
noid schizophrenia and a borderline personality disorder respectively.
The man needed surgery because of a medical condition and the
woman had a long history of self-harm through blood-letting, and no
longer wanted to receive blood transfusions to keep her alive follow-
ing such incidents. In other words, in none of these cases had the
adult made an advance directive in the abstract, without a particular
medical situation being contemplated.
Given this context, namely the relative certainty of the medical
situation or the desired outcome, it might be predicted that the
advance directives would be followed, and the treatment not provided
to the individual. However, this has not been the trend in the eight
decisions, where the individual’s advance directive was followed in
only three cases.61
These eight cases are examined in the next section. While some of
the decisions handed down are supportable, it is submitted that there
are also some troubling aspects of the decision-making process that
have been employed by the relevant courts. The following analysis
casts doubt on whether the principle of self-determination in reality
60 [2009] NSWSC 761.
61 See Appendix for a summary of each case and the court’s determination.
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prevails over the principle of sanctity of life. The decided cases sug-
gest that the courts are loath to respect an advance directive that
refuses life-sustaining treatment where following the directive will
result in the death of an individual, even where, on an objective as-
sessment, the directive is valid and applicable to the circumstances.
The courts seem to be overly influenced by or concerned about the
‘bias in favour of life’, which results in decisions being made that are
not supportable on an objective assessment of the facts.62 The undue
‘bias in favour of life’ permeates many aspects of the courts’ delibera-
tions and judgments even where there is no evidence of doubt. The
analysis that follows provides evidence of this bias in favour of life
which has, in some cases, resulted in decisions that are difficult to
justify. As explored in the next section, there are three legally sig-
nificant factors that have contributed to an outcome (of not following
an advance directive) that is not entirely defensible:
• An unprincipled evolution of common law principles;
• Inappropriate adjudication by judicial or quasi-judicial bodies;
and
• Strained interpretation of facts by judicial or quasi-judicial
bodies.
In addition, there is a fourth factor which, although not directly
contributing to a particular outcome, is evidence of, and provides
some insight into, the reluctance of some judges to uphold an advance
directive that refuses life-sustaining medical treatment.
V. Unprincipled Evolution of Common Law Principles
The only requirement for an advance directive to be valid is that the
adult possessed the requisite capacity at the time of completion, could
communicate the treatment decision, and there were no vitiating fac-
tors such as undue influence or duress present at the time of its
completion.63 Nevertheless, some of the cases signal an unprincipled
evolution of common law principles which effectively place more legal
obstacles in the way of medical professionals relying on an indi-
vidual’s previously expressed wish to refuse treatment. These devel-
opments are difficult to justify on the basis of established legal
principle.
i. Requirement that the Advance Directive be Based on Sufficient
Information
In addition to the requirements of capacity, the ability to communicate
and the absence of vitiating factors, statements in some of the cases
62 Compare Maclean, above n. 6, where he argues that the judiciary only selectively
uphold advance directives, choosing to uphold only those that they regard as
being ‘reasonable’. See also Michalowski, above n. 5.
63 See section II and nn. 14 and 16 above.
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suggest that an advance directive will only be valid if it is based on
sufficient knowledge or information. The suggestion is that the adult
must be informed about treatment options before giving the directive,
or at least has made the advance directive with knowledge of his or
her illness and its likely progress. Two of the common law cases
concerning advance directives support this view.64
In Re AK (Medical Treatment: Consent),65 AK, who was suffering
from motor neurone disease, gave a direction that he wanted artificial
ventilation stopped two weeks after he could no longer communicate.
While finding that the directive was valid, Hughes J made a number of
observations about the care that a court must take in coming to such a
conclusion:
Care must be taken to investigate with what knowledge the expression of
wishes was made. All the circumstances in which the expression of
wishes was given will of course have to be investigated. In the present
case the expressions of AK’s decision are recent and are made not on
any hypothetical basis but in the fullest possible knowledge of impending
reality. I am satisfied that they genuinely represent his considered wishes
and should be treated as such [emphasis added].66
The implication is that an advance directive must be made with at
least some knowledge, though the extent of knowledge is not elabor-
ated upon by his Honour.
The law, as articulated by Hughes J, was specifically endorsed by
Munby J in HE v A Hospital NHS Trust67 in coming to his decision that
a formal advance directive previously completed by a 24-year-old
woman could no longer be regarded as operative.68
A different approach was taken recently by the New South Wales
Supreme Court in Hunter and New England Area Health Service v A,69
64 This view is also advanced by some commentators, purportedly relying on
comments of Donaldson MR in Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95 at
115: see Kennedy and Grubb, above n. 14 at 2037 and Michalowski, above n. 5 at
958. Although Donaldson MR referred to the need to advise a patient in broad
terms of the nature and effect of the procedure before obtaining consent or
refusal, he rejected the notion that ‘informed refusal’ had become part of English
common law, and stopped short of suggesting that a level of information was
required for an advance refusal to be valid. As such, this case is not considered
further in this section of the paper.
65 [2001] FLR 129.
66 Ibid. 134.
67 [2003] 2 FLR 408 at [32].
68 Note that similar suggestions were made by the Michigan Court of Appeals in the
United States decision of Werth v Taylor 475 NW 2d 426 (1991). Despite the
patient, a Jehovah’s Witness, completing a number of ‘Refusal to Permit Blood
Transfusion’ forms, the medical professional gave the patient a blood transfusion.
In finding that the prior refusal did not bind the doctor, the court commented that
‘her refusals were . . . not contemporaneous or informed’: 475 NW 2d 426 (1991),
[150]. The court continued that ‘[w]ithout contemporaneous refusal of treatment
by a fully informed, competent adult patient, no action lies for battery’ (emphasis
added): 475 NW 2d 426 (1991), [150].
69 [2009] NSWSC 761.
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a case involving a Jehovah’s Witness who had completed a document
refusing dialysis. While not citing any authority in support,
McDougall J referred to the proposition that failure to provide ade-
quate information could operate to vitiate a refusal of treatment.70 His
Honour, however, rejected this notion, and commented as follows:
I do not accept the proposition that, in general, a competent adult’s
clearly expressed advance refusal of specified medical procedures or
treatment should be held to be ineffective simply because, at the time of
statement of the refusal, the person was not given adequate information
as to the benefits of the procedure or treatment (should the circum-
stances making its administration desirable arise) and the dangers con-
sequent upon refusal. As I have said, a valid refusal may be based upon
religious, social or moral grounds, or indeed on no apparent rational
grounds; and is entitled to respect . . . regardless.71
It is submitted that this latter approach is more consistent with both
authority and the reality of life. It is contrary to established common
law principles to impose an additional requirement, over and above
capacity, the ability to communicate and the absence of vitiating fac-
tors, that an adult must be informed or have knowledge about the
progress of his or her illness or about treatment options for his or her
advance directive to be valid. The imposition of such a requirement is
inconsistent with the law regarding the ability of a competent adult to
contemporaneously refuse a life-sustaining measure. It is now settled
law that:
Prima facie every adult has the right and capacity to decide whether or
not he will accept medical treatment, even if a refusal may risk perman-
ent injury to his health or even lead to premature death. Furthermore, it
matters not whether the reasons for the refusal were rational or irra-
tional, unknown or even non-existent.72
Consistent judicial pronouncements have since been made on many
occasions.73 If the law accepts that a competent adult may refuse life-
sustaining medical treatment even if his or her reasons for doing so
are ‘irrational, unknown or even non-existent’, it must follow that the
decision can be made in the absence of knowledge or information that
would inform the decision. The suggestion that the reasons for the
decision may be ‘non-existent’ implies that the decision could be
70 Ibid. [27].
71 Ibid. [28].
72 Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 115 at 664.
73 See, for example, Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 at 864; Re MB
(Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 426 at 432; Re B (Adult: Refusal of Medical
Treatment) [2002] 2 All ER 449 at 455–6; HE v A Hospital NHS Trust [2003] 2 FLR
408 at 414.
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made without good cause, or without all or any of the relevant
information.74
That a competent person may refuse treatment without receiving all
relevant information also reflects the reality of life. A person may have
a life-threatening disease or illness, but may choose not to seek med-
ical advice or, if sought, to refuse medical treatment that is offered.
The state does not and cannot intervene in such circumstances to
compel medical treatment. Provided that the adult has capacity, the
decision not to seek medical treatment, or to refuse medical treatment
that is offered, is clearly a valid decision. This is the case whether or
not the decision not to seek medical advice, or to refuse treatment, is
based on full or any knowledge about the illness or treatment
options.
If this is correct, as it must be, then the same must be the case for an
advance refusal. There is no principled reason for suggesting that
an adult must have a greater knowledge of relevant facts about, for
example, the illness or treatment options, just because he or she seeks
to refuse treatment in advance of the medical situation arising. If a
court disregards an individual’s advance directive because it is based
on insufficient knowledge or information, the court will effectively be
compelling the individual to receive medical treatment, an outcome
that is demonstrably unacceptable when considered in the context of
a contemporaneous refusal. It should be equally unacceptable for an
advance refusal.75
It is certainly appropriate to investigate the circumstances in which
the expression of wishes was given. For example, a court must be
satisfied that the directive was given in the context of deciding his or
her future treatment, and was not an abstract thought about medical
treatment in general. However, for the reasons just explained, it
cannot be the case that the adult must possess a greater degree of
knowledge when completing the advance directive for it to be valid.
Such an obligation is illogical, inconsistent with authority and repre-
sents an unjustifiable extension of (or departure from) common law
principles.
74 Compare the contrary suggestion by Martin CJ in the recent Western Australian
decision of Brightwater Care Group (Inc) v Rossiter [2009] WASC 229, a case
involving a request by a competent adult, a quadriplegic, to have his artificial
hydration and nutrition tube withdrawn. Martin CJ suggested that the common
law right to determine and direct the extent of treatment is dependent on whether
he has been ‘provided with full information with respect to the consequences of
any decision he might make’: [2009] WASC 229, [49].
75 For support for the proposition that an advance directive will be valid in the
absence of knowledge or information about the individual’s condition or
treatment options, see Willmott, White and Howard, above n. 14 at 220–2. This
view is also consistent with the views expressed by J. Munby QC, as he then was,
in ‘Rhetoric and reality: The limitations of patient self-determination in
contemporary English law’ (1998) 14 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and
Policy 315 at 316–17.
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(a) Effect of Statutory Reform
It is interesting to observe that a requirement to receive information
about the condition and treatment options has not, as a general pro-
position, been imposed by legislation as a prerequisite for an advance
directive that refuses life-sustaining medical treatment. In the United
Kingdom, while a person is encouraged to discuss an advance direct-
ive with his or her medical professional,76 failure to do so does not
invalidate the advance directive. The position is different in Victoria
where a medical professional must certify that the person has been
informed about his or her condition to an extent which is reasonably
sufficient to enable him or her to make a decision about refusing
treatment.77
ii. Issues of Proof
As outlined earlier, a competent adult can refuse life-sustaining med-
ical treatment. If a person lacks capacity or his or her decision is
overborne by the influence of another, the refusal of treatment will not
be legally effective.78 However, an important point is that the law
presumes that a person has capacity to make decisions about their
health care.79 This presumption applies in relation to all kinds of
health care, even if the decision is to refuse medical treatment that is
needed to sustain a person’s life.80 If a person’s capacity to refuse
treatment is disputed, the burden of proving that this is the case will
therefore rest with the person alleging a lack of capacity.81 Similarly, a
person who is alleging that the decision to refuse treatment is made as
a result of undue influence exercised by another party will need to
prove this to be the case.
The same issues are relevant for an advance refusal. The advance
directive must be valid at the time of its execution. To be a valid
advance refusal, the adult must have capacity and the directive must
be made free of undue influence.82 The same presumption as above
76 Mental Capacity Act 2005, Code of Practice, [9.14] and [9.27].
77 Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic), s. 5(1)(c). Compare the legislation enacted in
Western Australia, where a person is ‘encouraged’ to obtain medical advice prior
to completing an advance directive, but failure to seek or receive that advice does
not make the advance directive invalid: Guardianship and Administration Act
1990 (WA), ss 110Q(1)(b) and (2) and 110QA.
78 See, for example, Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95 at 116.
79 Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95 at 112; Re C [1994] 1 All ER 819 at
823–4; Re MB (Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 426 at 436; Re B (Adult: Refusal of
Medical Treatment) [2002] 2 All ER 449 at 457; HE v A Hospital NHS Trust [2003] 2
FLR 408 at 415; NHS Trust v T (Adult Patient: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [2005]
1 All ER 387 at 404–5.
80 Note, however, that the degree of capacity required to make a decision with grave
consequences is higher than for other kinds of decisions: see, for example, Re T
(Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95 at 113; Re MB (Medical Treatment)
[1997] 2 FLR 426 at 437; Re B (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [2002] 2 All ER
449 at 458.
81 HE v A Hospital NHS Trust [2003] 2 FLR 408 at 415.
82 For the purpose of this examination, it will be assumed that the adult had the
ability to communicate decisions, another prerequisite for validity.
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applies in relation to capacity: the law presumes that the adult had
capacity to make the advance directive and, if anyone disputes that
capacity, the burden of proof will rest on the person making the
allegation.83 The same principle would logically apply if a person is
alleging that the advance directive was made as a result of undue
influence.84 However, there are additional considerations that are rel-
evant in determining whether a medical professional should, at some
later time, rely on an advance directive. First, because of circum-
stances that have arisen since its completion, the medical professional
may legitimately query whether the directive remains valid. Secondly,
the medical professional must be satisfied that the advance directive is
applicable to the medical situation that has arisen.
A concerning feature of the case law on advance directives is that,
at least in England, an unprincipled approach has evolved to issues of
proof. The problematic authority is the following passage from
Munby J in HE v A Hospital NHS Trust:85
[23] Burden of proof: in my judgment, although the burden of proof on
the issue of capacity is on those who seek to dispute it, the burden of
proof is otherwise on those who seek to establish the existence and
continuing validity and applicability of an advance directive. So if there
is doubt that doubt falls to be resolved in favour of the preservation of
life.
[24] Standard of proof: clear and convincing proof is required.
Issues of burden and standard of proof will only be relevant once a
matter is before a court. If the matter involves an advance directive,
the court must determine whether the advance directive was valid at
the time of completion, continued to be in existence and is applicable
in the medical situation that has arisen. This determination is made on
the evidence before the court. The problem is Munby J’s assertion that
the person who is suggesting that the advance directive should oper-
ate has the onus of proving this to be the case. This assertion is
problematic at both legal and practical levels.
(a) Legal Concerns
First, the assertion that the person ‘seeking to establish the existence
and continuing validity and applicability of an advance directive’ has
the burden of proof must be open to question. A court will not uphold
an advance directive unless there is evidence that it was valid at the
83 HE v A Hospital NHS Trust [2003] 2 FLR 408 at 415.
84 While none of the cases on advance directives have engaged with the issue of
onus of proof if undue influence is alleged, it is submitted that the person alleging
such influence must discharge the onus of proof. Support for this assertion can be
drawn from the analogous situation where it is claimed that undue influence was
exercised over a testator when executing a will. Case authority in both England
and Australia provides that the onus of proving undue influence in such a case
rests on the party who alleges it: Boyse v Rossborough (1857) 10 ER 1192 at 1211
and Winter v Crichton (1991) 23 NSWLR 116 at 121.
85 [2003] 2 FLR 408.
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time of execution, and that it applies to the situation that has arisen.
To this extent, it is appropriate to suggest that a person who claims its
existence and applicability should lead evidence to that effect. How-
ever, if the court is satisfied of these factors, it is questionable whether
the same person should be required to prove its continued existence.
The court, at this point, should require the person claiming that the
advance directive was no longer in existence to discharge the burden
of proving this. While Munby J concedes that a person asserting that
the advance directive is no longer operative must point to something
suggesting why this may be so, at no stage does his Honour suggest
that a person claiming invalidity has an onus to discharge. His Hon-
our falls short of suggesting that, once the validity and applicability of
the advance directive is established in the first instance, the onus
shifts to the person disputing the continued validity and applicability
of the advance directive to prove that on the balance of probabilities.
There also seems to be an inconsistency about the extent to which
the validity or applicability of the directive needs to be called into
question. At one stage in his judgment, Munby J suggests that there
needs to be ‘some real reason to doubt’ its validity or applicability,
while elsewhere he suggests that ‘if there is doubt that doubt falls to
be resolved in favour of the preservation of life’. The latter phrase
seems to suggest something less than a ‘real reason to doubt’ may be
all that is required.
Further, Munby J’s assertion regarding the onus of proving the
continued validity and applicability is not supported by the three au-
thorities on which he purports to rely: Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treat-
ment),86 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland87 and Re AK (Medical Treatment:
Consent).88 The relevant extracts from the cases that are cited by
Munby J urge caution in interpreting an advance directive, and make
it clear that if there is doubt, the sanctity of life is favoured. However,
there is no suggestion that a person claiming that the advance direct-
ive should govern treatment must discharge any onus of proof. To this
extent, Munby J’s claim that a person has such an onus, is not based
on legal precedent.
A different approach and, it is submitted, one more consistent with
authority, was taken by McDougall J in Hunter and New England Area
Health Service v A.89 When considering whether the advance directive
was valid and applicable to the situation, his Honour made the follow-
ing comments:
There is a presumption that an adult is capable of deciding whether to
consent to or to refuse medical treatment. However, the presumption is
rebuttable. . . . If there is genuine and reasonable doubt as to the validity
of an advance care directive, or as to whether it applies in the situation
86 [1993] Fam 95.
87 [1993] AC 789.
88 [2001] FLR 129.
89 [2009] NSWSC 761.
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at hand, a hospital or medical practitioner should apply promptly to the
court for its aid.90
Two observations are relevant here. First, McDougall J does not refer
to any obligation on a party to prove the continuing validity and
applicability of the advance directive. The implication is that if the
advance directive was valid when executed and is applicable to the
situation that has arisen, the prima facie position is that it should be
followed. This is in conflict with Munby J’s position. Secondly,
McDougall J suggests that the advance directive should be challenged
only if there is a ‘genuine and real doubt’ regarding its validity or
applicability. This puts the test somewhat higher than that articulated
by Munby J.
The second cause for legal concern arising from Munby J’s state-
ments is that statements about the burden of proof are premised on
the fact that the matter has come before the court in an adversarial
context. This will not always be the case. A hospital, for example, may
seek declaratory relief about whether it is bound to follow an advance
directive that had been completed by an incompetent patient who
now requires treatment to save his or her life.91 In such a case, there is
no ‘person seeking to establish the validity and applicability of the
directive’ in the sense of actively advocating that the advance directive
should be followed. It is unclear how Munby J suggests the onus of
proof would be discharged in such a situation.
(b) Practical Concerns
Munby J’s approach also raises concerns on a practical level, namely
the limited number of cases in which a person will be able to dis-
charge the onus and standard of proof that is advocated by his
Honour. Imposing an onus about the ‘continuing validity’ on an indi-
vidual is problematic. Take the hypothetical case of an adult who had
been a practising Jehovah’s Witness all of her life. At age 30, she
completes an advance directive refusing blood products in all situ-
ations. This advance directive is kept with her general practitioner.
Ten years later, she is involved in a car accident and is taken to a
hospital where a decision must be made about a blood transfusion
that is needed to save her life. The treating team is aware of her
advance directive as they have contacted her doctor. This woman is
still a Jehovah’s Witness but she has not discussed her faith with her
doctor since completing the advance directive. The hospital brings an
application to court seeking declaratory relief. Applying the dicta of
90 Ibid. [40(7)]–[40(8)].
91 See, for example, Hunter and New England Area Health Service v A [2009]
NSWSC 761, where the Health Service was seeking declaratory relief about the
validity of the advance directive completed by the adult.
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Munby J, the onus of establishing the continuing validity and applic-
ability of the advance directive could not be satisfied. First, the ap-
plicant (the hospital) is not ‘seeking to establish’ the existence,
continuing validity or applicability of the advance directive in the
sense of arguing for a particular position. Secondly, there is no evid-
ence at all of its continuing validity. The only evidence is of its original
validity. Does this mean that the advance directive could be ignored?
Would the situation be the same if the woman in question had been in
the car accident only one year, one month, or one day after complet-
ing the advance directive?
A related but separate concern is Munby J’s observation that the
continuing validity and applicability of an advance directive must be
established by ‘clear and convincing proof’. While stating that the test
is the usual civil standard of proof on the balance of probability,
Munby J notes that the evidence must be stronger and more cogent
because of the gravity of the matter.92 There is a practical difficulty
with requiring clear and convincing proof of the advance directive’s
continuing validity and applicability. The case of HE v A Hospital NHS
Trust93 itself illustrates this concern. This case involved a Muslim
woman, AE, who was raised by a Jehovah’s Witness, and who had
signed an advance directive refusing blood products. At the time of
its execution, AE must have been emphatic about her desire not to
receive blood products because the directive also contained a clause
providing that the directive could only be revoked in writing. Almost
two years later, when contemplating surgery, she confirmed her
desire not to receive blood products, and these instructions formed
part of the hospital notes. Five months after that verbal confirmation,
the validity of the directive was challenged, and the court held that
there was not clear and convincing evidence of the directive’s con-
tinuing validity and applicability. The medical professionals were
authorized to treat AE in a way that promoted her best interests. In
coming to this decision, the court relied on verbal evidence of AE’s
father, a Muslim, that she changed her faith four months prior to the
hearing, which was one month after she told her doctor that she did
not want blood products. This evidence contradicted that of AE’s
mother, a Jehovah’s Witness, who advised hospital staff on AE’s ad-
mission that AE continued to be of the Jehovah’s Witness faith.
In this case, the adult had gone to significant lengths to set out her
wish to refuse blood products. A formal document was drawn up, and
that document included a clause saying that the refusal is absolute and
92 Munby J has subsequently reiterated his view about the need for ‘clear and
convincing proof’ in relation to an advance directive refusing life-sustaining
measures: The Queen (on the application of DJ) v The Mental Health Review
Tribunal [2005] EWHC 587 at [61]. Note, however, criticisms of Munby J’s
approach when this case went on appeal to the Court of Appeal: R (on the
application of AN) v The Mental Health Review Tribunal (Northern Region) [2006]
QB 468.
93 [2003] 2 FLR 408.
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not to be overridden in any circumstances by a purported consent of a
relative or other person. If a formal document of the kind used in this
case coupled with a later verbal confirmation that it still represented
her wishes do not constitute ‘clear and convincing proof’ of its con-
tinuing validity, it is difficult to envisage a case where this standard of
proof could be satisfied.
The approach taken by Munby J regarding the onus of proof is
difficult to justify and not consistent with established legal principles.
The practical consequences of such an approach, particularly in light
of the requirement for the standard of proof to be ‘clear and convin-
cing’, is that it is unlikely that an individual’s advance directive refus-
ing treatment will be followed. It is submitted that the approach taken
by McDougall J in Hunter and New England Area Health Service v A94
should be preferred as it is consistent with legal authority, and more
likely to result in outcomes that were intended by the individual who
made the advance directive.
(c) Effect of Statutory Reform
It is unlikely that legislation has affected the common law principles
that have been discussed above about burden and standard of proof.
In the United Kingdom and in a number of the statutes in Australia,
the legislation contains a presumption that an adult has capacity for a
particular decision.95 As such, evidence must be produced before that
presumption can be rebutted. In the United Kingdom, the legislation
specifically provides that the standard of proof is on the balance of
probabilities.96
Also relevant to issues of proof is the protection that is provided by
the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK) to a medical professional who is
confronted with an advance refusal. He or she does not incur liability
for carrying out treatment unless ‘satisfied’ that an advance decision
refusing treatment has been given.97 There is no requirement that the
medical professional act reasonably in forming that view.98 This is in
contrast to the protection afforded if treatment is withheld pursuant
to an advance decision. In the latter case, a medical professional is
protected only if he or she ‘reasonably believed’ that the advance
94 [2009] NSWSC 761.
95 In the United Kingdom, see Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK), s. 1(2). In Australia,
see the legislation of Queensland and Western Australia: Guardianship and
Administration Act 2000 (Qld), sch 1, s. 1; Guardianship and Administration Act
1990 (WA), s. 4(1)(b) respectively.
96 Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK), s. 2(4).
97 Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK), s. 26(2). Compare the Queensland legislation
which excuses a medical professional from ignoring an advance directive that
refuses treatment if he or she has reasonable grounds to believe that the direction
is ‘contrary to good medical practice’: Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld), s. 103.
98 Note that the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK), Code of Practice [9.58] provides that
a medical professional would not be ‘satisfied’ if he or she had ‘genuine doubts’
about the advance decision.
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decision was applicable.99 Where there is doubt, the matter can be
resolved by the Court of Protection. Given the failure of the legislation
to impose an objective standard that the medical professional be ‘sat-
isfied’ about the advance decision, and given the identified reluctance
of courts to uphold advance decisions that refuse treatment, it can be
predicted that courts may readily be persuaded that a medical pro-
fessional is not ‘satisfied’ that an advance decision applies to treat-
ment. If this occurs, medical professionals could, in reality, receive a
considerable amount of protection should they not comply with an
advance decision to refuse treatment.100
VI. Inappropriate Adjudication by Judicial or Quasi-
judicial Bodies
From a strictly legal perspective, the most alarming feature arising
from a review of the case law is the inappropriate conduct of judicial
(or quasi-judicial) bodies in hearing matters relating to the refusal of
treatment. Although some cases are brought in an emergency con-
text, the lack of familiarity with or ability to apply legal principles is a
recurring theme. This inappropriate adjudication manifests itself in
two ways: operational irregularities or failures, and a failure to apply
correct legal principles.
i. Operational Irregularities or Failures
An important case from the Australian State of Victoria concerning
refusal of blood products may well have been decided differently had
the determining body more appropriately discharged its duties.
Qumsieh’s case101 involved Q, a Jehovah’s Witness, who needed a
blood transfusion to sustain her life following the birth of her child. Q
had previously indicated that she did not want to receive blood prod-
ucts due to her religious beliefs. Despite his wife’s expressed position
regarding blood transfusions, Q’s husband brought an application to
the Victorian Guardianship and Administration Board for the ap-
pointment of a substitute decision-maker to make a decision about
medical treatment on Q’s behalf.
The hearing was attended by Q’s husband, his solicitor and the
hospital’s solicitor. The board was advised that Q did not want to
receive a blood transfusion and was also given the consent form in
which she refused blood or blood products in the context of treatment
to be carried out under anaesthetic. The board was not advised why Q
refused such products, nor was it given a copy of her ‘Advance Med-
ical Directive’ which contained a blanket refusal of blood products.
99 Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK), s. 26(3).
100 For further consideration of this issue, see Bartlett, above n. 49 at 82–3 and
Maclean, above n. 6.
101 Unreported decision, Victorian Guardianship and Administration Board, L
Pilgrim, 24 February 1998.
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Being satisfied that Q was no longer able to make medical decisions
for herself, the board appointed the Public Advocate as her guardian,
and her husband was ordered to be the delegated guardian of the
Public Advocate. He made a decision to allow the transfusion.102
The decision of the board was flawed because it did not ensure that
it had received all information relevant to its determination.103 The
board should have asked the parties why Q refused a blood transfu-
sion, and whether it had before it all relevant documentation in rela-
tion to that refusal. Not seeking such crucial evidence constituted a
failure by the board at an operational or practical level. Had the board
been advised that Q refused blood because of her religious beliefs,
and had read her Advance Medical Directive refusing blood products,
it is unlikely that it would have concluded that:
. . . [i]t had no evidence before it that the proposed represented person
did not want a guardian appointed to make health care decisions, out-
side her wishes expressed in the . . . informed consent form . . . which
was limited to an examination under anaesthetic.104
Instead, the board is likely to have dismissed the application for the
appointment of a guardian on the basis that the adult, while still
competent, had indicated that she did not want to receive the pro-
posed treatment in the situation that arose.105
ii. Failure to Apply Correct Legal Principles
Cases in which an urgent determination must be made about whether
life-sustaining treatment should be administered to a person who
might otherwise die but who has indicated an objection to that treat-
ment, are difficult. They are often brought before a court at short
notice, facts might be sketchy and legal argument is unlikely to be
comprehensive. Nevertheless, it is a concern when incorrect legal
principles are applied, particularly where the judgments signal that
the application of legal principle and exploration of the adult’s wishes
102 The board’s decision was unsuccessfully reviewed by Beach J of the Supreme
Court of Victoria. A transcription was not made of his Honour’s reasons for his
decision to decline the application to review. The Supreme Court of Victoria Court
of Appeal dismissed an appeal against the decision of Beach J in Qumsieh v The
Guardianship and Administration Board [1998] VSCA 45. For comment on the
decision of the Court of Appeal, see section VIII.i below.
103 Pursuant to the then s. 10(3) of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1986
(Vic), the board was not bound by rules or practice as to evidence but was
empowered to inform itself in relation to any matter in such manner as it thought
fit.
104 As cited in Qumsieh v The Guardianship and Administration Board [1998] VSCA
45, [8].
105 For a further example of a procedural irregularity, although in the context of a
contemporaneous refusal of blood products, see Fitzpatrick v K [2008] IEHC 104
where K refused a blood transfusion following the birth of her child. The hospital
brought an ex parte application to the High Court for a direction that K receive
blood. K, although conscious for most of the relevant time, was neither advised of
the application, nor was legal counsel appointed on her behalf to represent her
position.
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are secondary to the overall desire to sanction the provision of life-
sustaining treatment.
(a) Failure to Consider Whether Statements Constitute an
Advance Directive
The decision of Muir J of the Queensland Supreme Court in State of
Qld v Astill106 is illustrative of this concern. The hospital brought an
application to the Supreme Court to administer a blood transfusion to
A, a Jehovah’s Witness, contrary to the views expressed in her
advance directive. A’s daughter wanted her mother to receive the
transfusion, while her two sons wanted the hospital to adhere to her
mother’s wishes to refuse treatment. The court ordered the trans-
fusion to be given if a medical practitioner considered it necessary in
order to save her life or to enhance her prospects of recovery. In other
words, A’s expressed wishes were not followed. Of concern is how
that decision was reached.
At the outset of its judgment, the court considered the advance
directive completed by A. Because it did not comply with the formal-
ities of the relevant Queensland legislation, Muir J held that it ‘had no
efficacy’. The problem is that Muir J did not then consider whether the
document completed by A still constituted a common law advance
directive and, if it did, whether that directive would be binding on the
treating team. This failure was crucial. If it were held to be a common
law advance directive, that conclusion being highly probable on the
facts of the case, then the court should have considered whether,
under the Queensland legislation, that advance directive would be
binding. If it were, that should have been the end of the matter and the
court may have dismissed the hospital’s application. A’s wishes would
have been respected, and the transfusions not given.107
(b) Misguided Reliance on Precedent
In W Healthcare NHS Trust v H,108 the English Court of Appeal had to
determine whether earlier statements made by KH constituted an
106 Unreported decision, Supreme Court of Queensland, Muir J, 18 January 2006.
107 A similar misunderstanding of the true nature of an advance directive has
occurred in other jurisdictions. See, for example, Werth v Taylor 475 NW 2d 426
(1991), another case involving a Jehovah’s Witness who completed an advance
refusal of blood products. In that case, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that
the provision of blood products contrary to the advance directive did not
constitute an assault because her directive ‘had not been made when her life was
hanging in the balance or when it appeared that death might be a possibility if a
transfusion were not given’: 475 NW 2d 426 (1991), [150]. By its very nature,
however, an advance directive must be given in advance of the medical incident
arising. Further, there was no evidence that the maker of the directive
contemplated that the directive should only be relied upon in a non life-
threatening context. 
108 [2005] 1 WLR 834.
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advance directive not to reinsert the feeding tube after it became
dislodged. If they did, then that directive dictated treatment, and
health professionals would not be entitled to reinsert the tube. The
only issue for determination was whether KH’s prior statements were
sufficiently clear to constitute an advance directive. It is surprising,
therefore, why, in the context of the discussion of the legal effect of
KH’s statements, the Court observed that:
. . . there has been no case in the books to date in which the court has
sanctioned the withdrawal of treatment which is simply providing, in
effect, the equivalent of food and drink for anybody other than some-
body in a permanent vegetative state (in other words, someone who has
no feeling of anything whatsoever).109
This reference to previous case law on withdrawing or withholding
artificial hydration and nutrition to individuals in a persistent vegetat-
ive state is misguided. This quote appears to be referring to the cases
that have authorized withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration
from individuals in a persistent vegetative state. The legal principle
which supports withdrawal in such cases is that the treatment, the
provision of artificial nutrition and hydration, is futile. The court ap-
pears to be suggesting that withdrawal or withholding may not be
futile where the individual is not in a persistent vegetative state. How-
ever, such authority should not have been relevant in the case before
it. Instead, the court should have considered the cases on advance
directives. If KH had given an advance directive that refused artificial
hydration and nutrition, the treatment should not have been given.
Whether or not the treatment could be regarded as futile would be
irrelevant. In other words, cases concerning medical futility raise
completely different issues from those about advance directives and,
therefore, should have been irrelevant to the court’s consideration of
whether, in the case before it, the feeding tube should have been
reinserted on the grounds of KH’s prior statements.
(c) Effect of Statutory Reform
The concerns examined above stem from an apparent lack of familiar-
ity of some judicial and quasi-judicial bodies with the relevant legal
principles. This position is perhaps not surprising given the relative
scarcity of case law in this field, and the urgent context in which many
of these cases must be decided. Statutory reform is unlikely to have a
direct impact on the familiarity with legal principles in those jurisdic-
tions in which the common law continues to operate. However, legis-
lative enshrinement of an individual’s right to complete an advance
109 Ibid. 839–40.
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directive that refuses life-sustaining treatment is a positive step in the
direction of clarity and certainty. Legislation removes lingering
doubts about the enforceability of advance directives, and clearly
articulates the circumstances in which such refusals will be valid and
applicable.
VII. Strained Interpretation of Facts
The apparent reluctance of the judiciary to uphold an advance direct-
ive that refuses life-sustaining measures is also evident from how
some courts interpret the evidence that is presented to them. In some
of the cases where following an advance directive would result in a
person’s death, the judges have interpreted the facts in a strained way,
in an apparent attempt to reach a more ‘palatable’ result. In such
cases, courts have made findings of fact that have resulted in the
person’s advance directive not being followed. Arguably, such find-
ings are less open on the evidence than findings that the advance
directive was valid and applicable to the medical situation that had
arisen. This paper suggests that there are two contexts in which
courts are likely to interpret the facts in a strained way: in assessing
whether the individual had sufficient capacity at the time of complet-
ing the advance directive, and in assessing whether the individual
would have intended the advance directive to apply in the circum-
stances that had subsequently arisen.
i. Assessment of Competence
Before considering the approach taken by the courts to assessment of
competence, the following observations may be worth considering.
The cases in which the capacity of a person is called into question
generally involve an unconventional treatment decision being made,
and dire consequences flowing from that decision. The capacity of a
person is rarely, if ever, judicially considered in cases where a person
accepts treatment that is medically indicated. These facts invite
speculation on two levels. First, would the cases that were ultimately
judicially determined have reached the court if the person had
accepted rather than refused treatment? In other words, would the
person’s capacity have been called into question? Secondly, if the
same person accepted treatment and his or her capacity had been
judicially determined, would the court have reached a finding of in-
capacity? If the first question is answered in the negative, questions
may be raised about the medical profession’s ethical stance on estab-
lishing and assessing capacity of an adult to consent to treatment. If
the second question is answered in the negative, questions must be
asked about the legitimacy of the judicial determination of a person’s
capacity.
29
ADVANCE DIRECTIVES REFUSING TREATMENT AS AN EXPRESSION OF AUTONOMY
Late last century, there were a number of cases in which the capa-
city of a pregnant woman to make decisions about medical treatment
was called into question.110 Such situations commonly arose where
the woman wanted to refuse treatment, and that refusal placed the
woman’s foetus (and perhaps herself) at risk. In a number of cases, the
courts found that the woman lacked the necessary capacity to make
decisions about her own health care, thereby enabling treatment to be
given on the basis of the woman’s ‘best interests’.111 As such, the
welfare of the foetus was also safeguarded. Some commentators sug-
gested that courts have been quick to come to this conclusion because
the decision made by the pregnant woman is not one that sits com-
fortably with many individuals in mainstream society and, therefore,
the woman must lack capacity.112 In other words, the focus has been
on the apparent anti-social decision made by the woman that could
put her foetus at risk, rather than on an objective assessment of her
capacity to come to a decision.
Similar temptations confront courts in the context of an individual
who refuses life-sustaining medical treatment in circumstances where
most members of our community would accept such treatment. The
concern is that there may be a tendency to find that a person lacks
110 See, for example, Re S (adult: refusal of medical treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 671;
Norfolk and Norwich Healthcare (NHS) Trust v W [1996] 2 FLR 613; Rochdale
Healthcare (NHS) Trust v C, unreported decision, Johnson J, 3 July 1996; Re L
(patient: non-consensual treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 837; Glossop Acute Services Trust
v CH [1996] 1 FLR 762; Re MB (Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 426; St George’s
Healthcare NHS Trust v S; R v Collins, ex parte S [1998] 3 All ER 673. In Australia,
see State of Queensland v D [2004] 1 QdR 426.
111 Four English cases in particular are illustrative. In Re L (patient: non-consensual
treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 837 and Re MB (Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 426, the
woman was held to lack capacity to refuse a caesarean section because of a
needle phobia notwithstanding that the woman in each case did not suffer from
any psychiatric condition. In the first instance decision of Hogg J in St George’s
Healthcare NHS Trust v S; R v Collins, ex parte S, her Honour granted a
declaration dispensing with consent to treatment without investigating the extent
to which the woman lacked capacity. Her Honour was aware only that the woman
had been admitted under the Mental Health Act 1983 for an assessment of her
mental and psychiatric condition, and that ‘moderate depression’ had been
diagnosed. In Rochdale Healthcare (NHS) Trust v C, unreported decision, Johnson
J, 3 July 1996, his Honour found that the woman lacked capacity despite the
opinion expressed by the obstetrician that she was ‘fully competent’ and without
any other medical evidence to the contrary.
112 Indeed, this argument was advanced by counsel for the pregnant woman in Re
MB (medical treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 426 at 436, Mr Francis commenting that
‘both in the Rochdale Healthcare case and in Re L the judge misapplied the C test
by evaluating competence by reference to the irrationality of the decision’. See
also R. Bailey-Harris, ‘Pregnancy, Autonomy and Refusal of Medical Treatment’
(1998) 114 The Law Quarterly Review 550 who comments on the various legal
techniques, including finding the woman temporarily incompetent, that are used
to authorise a Caesarean section notwithstanding the woman’s refusal; and
Maclean, above n. 6 at 3 where the author refers to the ‘fragility of the patient’s
self-determination in the face of preserving valued life in the Caesarean section
cases’.
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capacity because he or she refuses life-sustaining treatment in circum-
stances where most individuals would act differently.113
The judiciary itself has cautioned medical professionals against as-
suming incapacity on the basis of a patient making a decision con-
trary to medical advice. In a case involving a woman with tetraplegia
who wished to be taken off artificial ventilation, and where the treat-
ing clinicians refused to act on her direction, the court noted and
concurred with the following comments of an expert witness:
. . . the clinicians started from the decision made by Ms B, and not from
the assessment of her competence. They looked too much at the deci-
sion, which was contrary to their advice and which they would not
endorse, and not enough at the surrounding circumstances. The clini-
cians were unable to accept her views and deal with them.114
While these comments were directed at medical professionals, it is
submitted that some judges struggle with the same temptation. The
argument is that, at the outset the judiciary is drawn to a conclusion
that the adult lacks capacity because of the uncomfortable and socially
unacceptable treatment choice he or she has made. To support this
finding of incapacity, the courts stretch or strain the facts in a way
that they would not do if the adult had made a different treatment
choice. The following case raises questions about the ability or pre-
paredness of courts to make a finding of capacity in circumstances
where that finding may effectively uphold a refusal of treatment that
would result in an individual’s death.
NHS Trust v T (Adult Patient: Refusal of Medical Treatment)115 in-
volved an assessment of T’s capacity to complete an advance directive
refusing blood transfusions. T engaged solicitors to draft her advance
refusal, and the document contained two reasons for her refusal.
First, to use her words:
. . . because I am caught in a vicious circle . . . too difficult for me to
continue enduring. I am not aware of when I am cutting myself, and
therefore cannot prevent my [haemoglobin] dropping very low periodic-
ally. Having a transfusion does not resolve this problem in the long
term, only causes stress to myself.116
Secondly, she believed her blood was ‘evil’ and, once the transfused
blood mixed with her blood, it also became evil.
There was mixed evidence about T’s capacity. T’s general practi-
tioner had written a letter stating that T understood the nature and
effect of the directive, and this letter was attached to the directive. The
specialist medical evidence presented at the hearing was divided.
113 For a comment on the ease with which judges are able to come to a decision that
an individual lacks capacity in the context of the refusal of life-sustaining medical
treatment, see also Munby QC, above n. 65 at 325–7.
114 Re B (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [2002] 2 All ER 449 at 468.
115 [2005] 1 All ER 387.
116 Ibid. [8].
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Nevertheless, the court held that T lacked capacity to complete an
advance directive.
This case was undoubtedly a difficult one. T was suffering from a
long-term, probably untreatable, personality disorder which resulted
in self-harming behaviour. However, there was consistent and undis-
puted evidence that T did not want to receive blood transfusions: T
consistently made contemporaneous refusals of blood (before being
persuaded to accept the transfusion); she attempted to formalize that
refusal by approaching solicitors to draft a written advance directive;
when given blood contrary to the written advance directive, she again
approached her solicitors to write to the hospital to advise them to
respect the directive.
Although the medical evidence about her capacity was not unan-
imous, there was enough evidence upon which the court could have
held T to have capacity. The case is consistent with judicial reluctance
to uphold a person’s directive where that would result in the person’s
death.117
It is interesting to compare this case with the earlier decision of the
High Court in Re C (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment),118 a case
involving a 68-year-old man, C, who was suffering from schizo-
phrenia and who refused to undergo an amputation of his leg despite
medical advice that he may die without this procedure. C also suffered
from a mental illness and again, as in NHS Trust v T (Adult Patient:
Refusal of Medical Treatment),119 the medical evidence was divided
about C’s capacity to make a refusal about treatment in the future.
Nevertheless, the court held that C had capacity to make an advance
decision to refuse the amputation. In coming to its decision, the court
seemed to take a different approach to the court in NHS Trust v T in an
important respect. In the latter case, the court was heavily influenced
by T’s belief that her blood was ‘evil’, a belief integrally related to her
mental illness. In contrast, despite C’s oral evidence that he had an
international career in medicine during which he had never lost a
patient, the court held that C’s delusions did not affect his ability to
make a decision about amputation. In other words, there was a
greater preparedness to conclude that a person could have capacity to
make a treatment decision, despite having a mental illness.120
117 There is evidence of this kind of judicial reluctance in other jurisdictions. See, for
example, Fitzpatrick v K [2008] IEHC 104, a case involving the contemporaneous
refusal of blood products. In the plenary hearing of the matter in the High Court,
Laffoy J held that K lacked capacity at the time she refused treatment,
notwithstanding a decision to the contrary by Abbott J on the earlier ex parte
application and the contrary evidence of the medical staff at the ex parte
application.
118 [1994] 1 All ER 819.
119 [2005] 1 All ER 387.
120 Note the suggestion by Maclean, above n. 6 at 5, that the court may have been
more inclined to uphold the advance refusal in this case as C was a ‘dangerous
schizophrenic who had stabbed someone and whose life, arguably, was simply a
burden for society’.
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ii. Assessment of Whether an Adult Intended an Advance
Directive to Apply to the Situation that Arose
A medical professional should only comply with an advance directive
that refuses life-sustaining medical treatment if the person intended it
to apply in the situation that later arose. As part of this assessment, it
must be determined whether the terms of the advance directive are
sufficiently clear to govern treatment. If there is a reasonable doubt
about the person’s intentions, it would be contrary to the law, morality
and public policy to refuse treatment and allow the person to die.
However, an individual’s autonomy will be undermined if the court
places too high a standard on the degree of specificity required for the
advance directive to operate.
There is a number of decisions in which the assessments by courts
of what the adult intended are difficult to sustain. The first, W Health-
care NHS Trust v H,121 involved an application brought by a hospital to
reinsert a percutaneous gastrostomy (PEG) tube into a 59-year-old
woman, KH, who had suffered from multiple sclerosis for about 30
years. Her family and friends opposed the reinsertion and argued that
such action was contrary to the previously expressed views of KH.
The woman’s daughter gave evidence that before KH moved into a
nursing home, she told her daughter that she did not want to be kept
alive by machines. A close friend of KH, Mrs N, also gave evidence.
KH told Mrs N repeatedly that she did not ever want to be a burden to
her daughters if she could not look after herself. If she had to go to
hospital, and the time came when she could no longer recognize the
girls, she did not want to be kept alive. KH had reiterated these state-
ments as her condition deteriorated and she became more dependent
on the nursing staff. Mrs N had no doubt that, in the current state of
health, KH would want to be allowed to die in peace.
Despite this undisputed and apparently credible evidence, the
Court of Appeal held that the conversations that KH had with her
daughter and close friend did not constitute advance directives relev-
ant to the situation before it. The conversations, according to the
court, were not sufficiently clear and referable to the particular cir-
cumstance. Although it was conceded that the statements made by
KH would be sufficient to refuse life-support machines, they were not
specific enough to operate as a ‘direction that she preferred to be
deprived of food and drink for a period of time which would lead to
her death in all circumstances’.122
It is submitted that the approach of the Court of Appeal was too
narrow. There was clear evidence that KH did not want to be kept
alive in these circumstances. The fact that she did not specify the
121 [2005] 1 WLR 834.
122 Ibid. 840.
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medical treatment that she wished to refuse should have been irrelev-
ant. If it would be lawful for a competent person to refuse the particu-
lar life-sustaining measure in question, then the fact that that
particular treatment was not specified by KH should not be a reason
for ignoring her advance refusal of treatment.
The English decision of Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment),123 al-
though regarded as a case about contemporaneous refusal rather
than an advance refusal, also raised the issue of the scope of the
adult’s refusal, and whether it extended to the medical situation that
arose. T, who had been losing blood since the birth of her child,
indicated to the treating team that she did not want to receive blood
products because she still retained some beliefs of the Jehovah’s Wit-
ness faith. There was uncontested evidence that this statement was
made on a number of occasions, and that T also signed a refusal of
blood form. There was also evidence of conversations between T and
medical professionals that it was unlikely that there would be a need
for a blood transfusion, and of T’s understanding that non-blood
products could be used frequently in substitution for blood. Justice
Ward, at first instance, held that T’s refusal did not apply to the situ-
ation that arose, because she refused blood in circumstances where
she did not believe blood would be needed to save her life. This
decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal. To support his findings,
Ward J relied on evidence of T’s father, not a Jehovah’s Witness, that T
would rather receive blood than die.
The problem with this decision is that there was clear evidence that
T did not want blood products. There was no suggestion in the evid-
ence that T’s refusal was only intended to apply if her life were not at
risk. In fact, at the times the refusals were given, T’s health was seri-
ously compromised and her condition was deteriorating. The court
strained the facts that were before it to justify not following T’s refusal
of treatment.
(a) Effect of Statutory Reform
This section of the paper has examined the approach taken by the
courts when confronted with a case involving the refusal of life-
sustaining medical treatment. The argument is that courts are re-
luctant to make a determination that results in withholding or
withdrawing treatment that is medically indicated. To reach such a
determination, the judiciary sometimes must strain the facts before it.
It is submitted that this reluctance to reach a conclusion that may
result in a person’s death is unlikely to alter as a result of legislative
reform. However, such reform may indirectly address the problem.
The legislation generally requires an advance directive to be in writ-
ing and, in some jurisdictions, requires it to be in a prescribed form.
123 [1993] Fam 95.
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Further, the Mental Capacity Act 2005 provides that an advance deci-
sion will only be effective if the document specifies that the refusal will
operate ‘even if life is at risk’.124 Such requirements may result in
clearer instructions being given, and therefore provide less opportun-
ity for the judiciary to read down or misinterpret a person’s
instructions.
Nevertheless, there are some issues arising from the Mental Ca-
pacity Act 2005 (UK) in terms of whether an advance directive will
govern treatment which may require judicial interpretation. One
example is section 25(2)(c) which provides that an advance decision is
not valid if the individual ‘has done anything else clearly inconsistent
with the advance decision remaining his fixed decision’ (emphasis
added). The interpretation given to the words ‘clearly inconsistent’
will obviously directly affect the extent to which a person’s decision
will operate. Yet, those words are capable of either a wide or narrow
interpretation.125 A further, but related, example is whether the incon-
sistent action must be taken while the adult still has capacity. The
legislation is silent on this point, and arguably either interpretation
may be taken.126 Again, the judicial interpretation of this issue will
affect the extent to which a person’s autonomous choice will govern
treatment.
VIII. Rhetoric and Approach in Judgments Reveal
Preference for the Principle of Sanctity of Life
The focus of the previous three sections of this paper has been on
legal errors made, or surprising approaches taken by the courts when
deciding whether advance directives should dictate treatment. The
submission of this paper is that such errors or unconventional ap-
proaches have occurred because (at least some) judges are anxious to
decide cases in a particular way, namely that life-sustaining medical
treatment should not be withheld from an incompetent individual
pursuant to an instruction in an advance directive so that he or she is
left to die. This hypothesis is also supported by how the judgments are
crafted, including the words and expressions chosen to convey the
decision and the reasons for it, and a failure to engage with the
importance of the principle of self-determination. The language used
by individuals can portray important information about their under-
lying beliefs and values, and these beliefs and values can and do
124 Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK), s. 25(5)(a).
125 See, for example, Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK), Code of Practice in [9.43] which
suggests that changes in a person’s personal life, for example, through pregnancy
may be sufficient to affect the validity of an advance decision.
126 For a further consideration of this issue, see Maclean, above n. 6.
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influence decisions that are made.127 It is submitted that this is particu-
larly evident in the cases examined in this paper, the choice of words
and expressions conveying the underlying beliefs and values of many
judges that the principle of sanctity of life should prevail unless that
determination is simply indefensible on the facts before it.
i. Lack of Discussion of or Emphasis on the Principle of Self-
determination
The advance directive cases contain many examples that indicate the
overriding importance placed on the sanctity of life, even in the face
of compelling evidence that the individual concerned would rather
not be kept alive. The persistent emphasis on the sanctity of life, even
while, at times, espousing the rhetoric of the paramountcy of self-
determination, subtly suggests that sanctity of life should be the pre-
ferred principle where the principles conflict.
The decision of Beach J of the Victorian Supreme Court in
Qumsieh’s case provides such an example. The Guardianship and Ad-
ministration Board appointed Q’s husband to be his wife’s guardian,
and he decided that a transfusion should be given to his wife despite
her prior refusal in two formal documents. Beach J of the Victorian
Supreme Court was asked to review the board’s decision. In exercis-
ing his discretion not to do so, Beach J commented that ‘the order [of
the board] was made to save her life and no court would contemplate
exercising its discretion to grant a remedy’.128 Given that the common
law requires a person’s advance directive to prevail over the decision
of a substitute decision-maker regarding treatment, this attitude is
surprising. Beach J’s comments provide insight into his views, namely
that preserving Q’s life was the ultimate goal of the Guardianship and
Administration Board’s deliberation, even if her wish was that she not
be given a blood transfusion. As Q’s life was saved, she should not be
entitled to relief in the form of a review of the board’s decision. Such
an approach is consistent with the notion that sanctity of life should
prevail over self-determination.
Similar views were expressed by the Court of Appeal of Victoria on
appeal.129 In dismissing Q’s appeal, the court agreed with the deter-
mination of Beach J that ‘no matter of substantial importance was
involved’ which required the board’s decision to be reviewed.130
127 For a comparative analysis of how the personal views of judges in another
medical context, sperm harvesting cases, can affect or inform the outcomes, see
M. Leiboff, ‘Post-mortem sperm harvesting, conception and the law: rationality or
religiosity?’ (2006) 6(2) Queensland University of Technology Law and Justice
Journal 1.
128 [1998] VSCA 45 at [11].
129 [1998] VSCA 45.
130 Ibid. at [19]. There were a number of factors detailed at para. [19] which drew the
Court of Appeal to this conclusion including the ‘large number and variety of
grounds upon which the appellant was seeking to challenge the Board’s decision,
the number of respondents whom the appellant desired to be made parties . . .,
the fact that the matter involved an order, now exhausted, made by a body whose
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Again, this conclusion is concerning. The comments reveal the same
approach taken at first instance. The court did not accept the proposi-
tion that the board had sufficient information before it to make ‘alarm
bells ring’, and appeared to be satisfied as to how the hearing was
conducted by the board. The Court of Appeal judgment did not reveal
any concern about the expressed wishes of an individual to refuse
treatment being ignored. Implicit in this judgment is the lack of
acknowledgement of the paramountcy of the principle of self-
determination.131
The language used by the English Court of Appeal in W Healthcare
NHS Trust v H132 also conveyed the court’s emphasis on the sanctity of
life, without similar regard to self-determination. Here, the court was
required to determine whether previous statements made by a
59-year-old woman suffering from multiple sclerosis constituted a
common law advance directive. After recounting the undisputed facts,
the court set out the relevant law. This description of the law com-
menced with the following statements:
English law places a very high value on life. The value that English law
places on life is now reiterated by art 2 of the European Convention on
Human Rights . . . which recited that everyone’s right to life shall be
protected by law.133
The court proceeded to describe the law that applies where a patient
loses competence and a decision needs to be made about his or her
treatment. Reference was made to the two different legal regimes that
operate: the best interests test and the substituted judgment test.
Interestingly, in the course of this consideration, the court did not
emphasize, in addition to ‘life’, that an individual’s right to self-
determination was also valued highly under English law, a fact equally
relevant to a discussion of this area of law. Such an omission flags this
court’s view about the relative importance of the principles of sanctity
of life and self-determination.
The language used by Muir J of the Supreme Court of Queensland
in State of Queensland v Astill134 also provides insight into his
Honour’s perspective of what is important in making determinations
about life-sustaining medical treatment. The failure of the court to
consider whether the formal document signed by A, a Jehovah’s Wit-
ness, in which she refused blood transfusions constituted a common
law advance directive, was considered earlier. More generally, in the
statutory powers and functions have changed, and the fact that the order, if made,
would bring the appellant into dispute with her husband’. However, the major
issue considered by the Court of Appeal in its judment was the conduct of the
board in its hearing.
131 See Hamblin, above n. 6, who opines that this case highlights the judicial
reluctance to uphold previously stated refusals where that would result in the
adult’s death.
132 [2005] 1 WLR 834.
133 Ibid. 837.
134 Unreported decision, Supreme Court of Queensland, Muir J, 18 January 2006.
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course of his judgment, Muir J made some comments which sug-
gested that other considerations were more important than following
A’s stated wishes. To cite one example:
Were [A] able to be consulted, no doubt she would wish to weigh the
impact on her daughter should she die as a result of the accident and
should her death result from the lack of a blood transfusion.135
Muir J seems to be imposing his own view of morality on A. Implicit
in his statement is the view that A’s concern for how her daughter
may feel should prevail over her earlier, clearly stated wishes regard-
ing treatment. This postulation was in conflict with the evidence of A’s
sons who insisted she would not have wanted a blood transfusion.
Again, it is concerning that the principle of self-determination was not
given the significance that it is accorded under common law. Other
factors were regarded as more important on the facts of this case.136
The recent approach taken by McDougall in Hunter and New Eng-
land Area Health Service v A137 is more encouraging. The judgment
itself tracked how the principle of autonomy had been judicially
recognized in several jurisdictions. There was a clear and repeated
reference to the supremacy of this principle over that of the sanctity of
life. Indeed, one section of the judgment was headed ‘Supremacy of
the individual’s right’.
The emphasis given by McDougall J to the principle of autonomy is
encouraging. However, as illustrated by the above analysis, it is not
reflective of the approach taken by many of the judges who make
determinations about the validity and applicability of advance
directives.
ii. Use of Emotive and Value-laden Words
There are also examples in the judgments of language which positions
those reading the judgments to take a particular view of the facts. This
is done subtly, but often powerfully. The courts have used emotive and
value-laden language in their inquiry of whether ‘doubt’ exists in an
advance directive purporting to refuse life-sustaining medical treat-
ment. At times, courts have summarized or described the evidence
about the advance directive in a manner which draws the reader to
only one conclusion, that there is some doubt as to whether the indi-
vidual intended to refuse the life-sustaining medical treatment in the
situation that arose. The carefully chosen words used by the judges
are crafted to convince the public that the directive given, or words
used by the individual in question, could not be regarded as an ad-
vance directive refusing treatment. On a more objective view of the
evidence, an individual may not consider there to be any doubt in the
135 Ibid. p. 4 of transcript of proceedings.
136 In addition to how the daughter would feel if A died, the court considered the fact
that transfusions had already been given, and the views expressed by all family
members: p. 4 of transcript of proceedings.
137 [2009] NSWSC 761.
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words used or directive given by the adult. The following example is
illustrative of this contention.
In W Healthcare NHS Trust v H,138 there was undisputed evidence
before the court that H did not want to be ‘kept alive by machines’, did
not want to be kept alive if she could no longer recognize her girls,
and wanted to enjoy only the ‘best quality of life’. Nevertheless, the
court held that these statements did not constitute a common law
advance directive to refuse the reinsertion of a PEG upon its displace-
ment. The court framed the question to be decided in the following
way:
. . . the matter that has to be determined . . . is whether . . . when she
became incapable [H] would choose what would be a distressing form of
death by starvation over a period of two to three weeks as opposed to
remaining alive, not in pain or particular discomfort, and that she never
addressed her mind to that particular choice.139
When phrased in this way, it is not surprising that the court held that
she had not intended her previous statements to apply in the medical
situation that required determination.
Another example of language which indicates that the courts would
rather find that the advance directive refusing treatment did not
operate can be found in HE v A Hospital NHS Trust.140 The court held
that the adult did not intend her prior formal refusal of blood trans-
fusions to apply in the circumstances before it. Munby J commented
that: ‘. . . the question of whether an advance directive admittedly
made at some time in the past is still valid and applicable may require
especially close, rigorous and anxious scrutiny’ (emphasis added).141
Once again, Munby J’s approach can be contrasted with that of
McDougall J in Hunter and New England Area Health Service v A.142
The approach taken by McDougall J and the language that he employs
indicate his desire to give effect to the wishes of the individual, despite
the potentially significant nature of the outcome:
. . . if there is any real doubt as to the sufficiency of an advance refusal of
medical treatment, the court should undertake a careful analysis. But the
analysis should start by respecting the proposition that a competent
138 [2005] 1 WLR 834.
139 Ibid. at 839.
140 [2003] 2 FLR 408.
141 Ibid. at [25]. For further examples of the use of emotive language used in
judgments, see W Healthcare NHS Trust v H [2005] 1 WLR 834 at 842 where the
English Court of Appeal put the test in the following terms: ‘English law . . .
places a very heavy burden on those who are advocating a course which would
lead inevitably to the cessation of a human life’; and Werth v Taylor 475 NW 2d
426 (1991) at 430 where the Michigan Court of Appeals was not prepared to find a
medical professional liable for assault even though he knowingly provided a
blood transfusion contrary to the patient’s instructions in a formal advance
directive. In deciding that the directive was not applicable in these circumstances,
the court remarked that ‘[h]er prior refusals had not been made when her life was
hanging in the balance’ (emphasis added).
142 [2009] NSWSC 761.
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individual’s right to self-determination prevails over the State’s interest
in the preservation of life even though the individual’s exercise of that
right may result in his or her death. An over-careful scrutiny of the
material may well have the effect of undermining or even negating the
exercise of that right. It is necessary to bear in mind that not all those
who execute advance care directives are legally trained. Their words
should not be scrutinized with the care given to a particularly obscure
legislative expression of the will of Parliament [emphasis added].143
As can be seen, McDougall J’s words are in stark contrast to those
used by Munby J in justifying his decision not to comply with a direct-
ive refusing treatment.
(a) Effect of Statutory Reform
This section has analysed how judgments have been crafted to sup-
port or justify particular judicial outcomes. The approaches taken by
judges in communicating their decisions are unlikely to be affected by
statutory reform. As flagged earlier in the paper, it is likely to be the
case that when adjudicating on matters arising under legislation, out-
comes will continue to be driven by views about desirability of
advance directives that refuse treatment. It is anticipated, therefore,
that judgments will continue to contain emotive language to justify
the decision reached.
IX. Conclusions
The sanctity of life is a fundamental principle in a liberal democracy,
and this is reflected in the common law that relates to refusing med-
ical treatment. It is also recognized that this principle yields to that of
respect for individual autonomy and self-determination in the context
of refusing life-sustaining medical treatment either contemporane-
ously or through an advance directive. To a large extent, this also
reflects the position in those jurisdictions in which legislative reform
has occurred. In the United Kingdom, for example, an individual can
complete an advance refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment that
will bind medical professionals. Yet, an examination of the relevant
common law cases on advance directives in England and Australia
reveals some concerns about the extent to which the established hier-
archy of autonomy prevailing over sanctity of life reflects reality, at
least in the context of the court room. Further, there is no reason to
believe that the approach that will be taken by the judiciary in inter-
preting statutory provisions will afford autonomy any higher
recognition.
The cases dealt with in this paper are difficult. They raise the
emotive issues of death and dying, religious values and quality of life,
generally in the context of a difficult medical event or situation, and
143 Ibid. at [36]–[37].
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sometimes against a backdrop of complex family dynamics. The con-
sequences of the decisions are grave, as a finding of validity and
applicability of an advance directive will effectively result in the death
of a vulnerable individual. Although there are relatively few cases that
have considered the validity and applicability of advance directives,
an analysis of those cases reveals some concerning trends for indi-
viduals who value the right to determine their own medical treatment.
Those trends are reflected in the case law of both England and Aus-
tralia. This paper argues that, in many of these decisions, the under-
lying beliefs and views of the particular members of the judiciary who
are determining the matter, drive the outcomes. More specifically,
despite the clarity of the law on the supremacy of autonomy and self-
determination and the rhetoric to that effect in the judgments, some
judges simply regard the sanctity of life as the more compelling prin-
ciple, and allow that principle to dictate the outcome.
This paper does not argue that this approach is taken in all judg-
ments or by all members of the judiciary. Indeed, the approach taken
recently by McDougall J of the New South Wales Supreme Court
reveals not only a willingness, but a concerted attempt to determine
the individual’s wishes, notwithstanding that complying with such
wishes would result in his death. Despite this encouraging judgment,
the failure to truly embrace principles of autonomy can be observed in
the majority of the cases concerning advance directives. There is cer-
tainly significant evidence of this trend in many of the decisions on
advance directives.
It is, and should be, the case that, where doubt exists, an advance
directive refusing treatment should not be followed. In such a situ-
ation, it is appropriate for the judiciary to err ‘in favour of life’. How-
ever, the case law suggests that many judges are biased in favour of
life, even in the absence of doubt, and this bias can and does drive
outcomes. The result is dangerous at two levels. First, there are
examples where the outcome has not been the desired one for the
individual who is the subject of litigation, and whose previous state-
ments about treatment have been ignored. Secondly, there are im-
plications for our society more broadly. The decisions signal a
warning to individuals who wish to ensure that their death occurs in
circumstances that are acceptable to them: it is unsafe to assume that
the judiciary will practise what it preaches, and allow the principle of
self-determination to prevail over that of sanctity of life.
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Appendix
Case Facts Decision
Re C (Adult: Refusal
of Medical Treatment)
[1994] 1 All ER 819
High Court, Family
Division
C was a 68-year-old man
suffering from paranoid
schizophrenia. He lived in a
secure hospital and was serving
a seven-year period of
imprisonment. C was also
suffering from peripheral
vascular disease which led to
gangrene in his foot. The
treating team predicted that
unless his leg was amputated
from beneath the knee, C had
an 85 per cent chance of dying.
C did not consent to the
amputation and, following more
conservative treatment, C’s
condition improved. C’s
condition placed him at risk in
the future, and the hospital
indicated that amputation may
be necessary. C sought an
injunction restraining the
hospital from carrying out an
amputation without his express
written consent.
The injunction was
granted. It is implicit
in this decision that
the adult’s prior
refusal constituted a
valid advance
directive and, unless
the adult’s
circumstances altered
in the future, should
be followed.
Re AK (Medical
Treatment: Consent)
[2001] 1 FLR 129
High Court, Family
Division
AK was a 19-year-old man
suffering from motor neurone
disease, and made an advance
directive at an advanced stage
of the disease. He was on a
ventilator and could only
communicate through moving
one eyelid to indicate ‘yes’ or
‘no’ to questions put to him. His
instructions were that his
ventilation should cease two
weeks after he could no longer
communicate. The hospital
sought a declaration that it
would be lawful for the treating
team to follow AK’s
instructions. At the time the 
The adult’s
communication was
held to constitute an
advance directive
which was valid and
applicable, and
should be followed.
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Case Facts Decision
matter was heard, AK was still
able to communicate through
limited movement of one eyelid.
HE v A Hospital NHS
Trust
[2003] 2 FLR 408
High Court, Family
Division
AE, although born a Muslim,
was raised by her mother as a
Jehovah’s Witness. When she
was 24, AE signed an advance
directive refusing blood
products. This directive also
contained a clause providing
that the directive could only be
revoked in writing. Almost two
years later, she saw a doctor
about her heart disease. In
contemplation of surgery, she
advised her doctor that she did
not wish to have blood
products. Five months later, AE
became seriously ill and was
rushed to hospital. The hospital
advised that she needed a blood
transfusion to save her life, but
her mother and brother said
that AE would not want to
receive a transfusion. AE’s
father brought an application to
the court seeking an order that
the advance directive no longer
applied and directing the
hospital to carry out the
transfusion.
The adult’s advance
directive was held not
to be valid and
applicable, and
should not be
followed.
W Healthcare NHS
Trust v H
[2005] 1 WLR 834
Court of Appeal, Civil
Division
KH was a 59-year-old woman
who had suffered from multiple
sclerosis for about 30 years.
She was being kept alive
through a percutaneous
gastrostomy (PEG) tube which
had become dislodged. A
decision had to be made
whether it should be reinserted.
The hospital brought an
application to court seeking
approval to reinsert the PEG
The appeal was
dismissed. The adult’s
previous statements
were held not to
constitute a valid and
applicable advance
directive and should
not be followed.
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tube. There was evidence
before the court that KH
previously directed that she did
not wish to receive treatment in
these circumstances. The
hospital’s application was
granted at first instance, and
KH’s brother and one of her
daughters appealed against that
decision.
NHS Trust v T (Adult
Patient: Refusal of
Medical Treatment)
[2005] 1 All ER 387
High Court, Family
Division
T was a 37-year-old woman
who suffered from a borderline
personality disorder. She had a
long history of self-harm by
cutting herself and bloodletting.
T was frequently admitted to
hospital after such incidents
and given life-saving blood
transfusions. She often refused
such treatment initially, but was
always subsequently persuaded
by health professionals to
accept the transfusion. In
January 2004, T approached
solicitors to assist her to draft
an advance directive refusing
blood transfusions to operate in
any subsequent hospital
admission. Despite this advance
directive, T was provided with a
further transfusion in April of
the same year, the hospital
receiving authorization from a
duty judge to do so. Following
release from the hospital, T
again approached her solicitor
who wrote to the hospital
advising it that T stood by her
advance directive. The hospital
applied to the Family Division
for directions.
The adult’s advance
directive held not to
be valid, and should
not be followed.
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Qumsieh’s case Q, a Jehovah’s Witness, was
admitted to hospital for the
birth of her first child. She had
earlier signed a document
headed ‘Advance Medical
Directive’ in which she refused
blood products, and signed a
form consenting to the
administration of anaesthetics
but added ‘with the exception
of blood transfusion or blood
products’. Complications
occurred following the delivery
of her child, and Q needed a
blood transfusion to save her
life. Given her prior refusal of
blood products, the hospital
refused to provide her with a
transfusion. With his wife’s
death imminent, her husband,
also a Jehovah’s Witness,
sought legal advice and an
application was brought to the
Victorian Guardianship and
Administration Board on the
same day.
Victorian
Guardianship and
Administration Board
Unreported decision,
Guardianship and
Administration
Board, L Pilgrim, 24
February 1998
The board appointed
the adult’s husband as
decision-maker (as
the delegated
guardian of the Public
Advocate) and the
husband consented to
the transfusion. The
effect of the board’s
decision was that the
adult’s advance
directive was not
followed.
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Supreme Court of
Victoria
Unreported decision,
Supreme Court of
Victoria, Beach J, 7
May 1998.
The court declined
Q’s application to
review the decision of
the board.
Supreme Court of
Victoria, Court of
Appeal
[1998] VSCA 45
The court dismissed
Q’s appeal against the
decision of Beach J.
High Court of
Australia
Qumsieh v Pilgrim
M98/1998, 29 October
1999, 11 February
2000.
The court declined
leave to review the
decision of the Court
of Appeal
State of Qld v Astill
Unreported decision,
Supreme Court of
Queensland, Muir J,
18 January 2006.
A, a Jehovah’s Witness, had
been involved in a serious car
accident, the car having been
driven by her daughter. A was
given a blood transfusion at the
scene and transported to
hospital where further
transfusions were administered.
On learning that A had
completed an advance directive
refusing blood products, the
hospital brought an application
to the Supreme Court seeking
an order to provide her with
blood products.
The court ordered
that the treating
medical practitioner
be entitled to provide
the adult with a blood
transfusion if that
was necessary to save
her life. The effect of
the decision was that
the adult’s advance
directive was not
followed.
Hunter and New
England Area Health
Service v A
[2009] NSWSC 761
Supreme Court of
New South Wales
A, a Jehovah’s Witness,
completed a document called a
‘worksheet’ in which he
expressly refused the medical
treatment of dialysis. About a
year later, A was admitted to
the emergency department of
the hospital suffering from
septic shock and respiratory
failure. A’s condition
deteriorated and he was being
The court held that
the document
constituted an
advance directive and
should be followed.
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kept alive by mechanical
ventilation and kidney dialysis.
The hospital brought an action
to determine whether the
document constituted a valid
advance directive and should be
followed.
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